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 Abstract 
 
 
Joint Vision 2020, the Department of Defense (DoD) blueprint for development 
and transformation, identifies information and technology as critical enablers for our 
nation’s military and calls for the development of a joint force capable of integrated 
information sharing to provide decision superiority, the ability to make and implement 
better decisions before enemies can react (DoD, 2000).  Networks have been identified as 
the single most important element for transforming our current military forces.  
Ironically, Air Force base-level communications networks have been identified as a 
weakness. 
 This research follows the qualitative approach to increases the current 
understanding of base level communications networks by conducting a multiple site 
comparative case study that includes practitioner interviews at four locations and the 
examination of existing literature and documented trip reports.  This study determines if 
base- level networks are disparate, isolates sources of disparity, identifies advantages and 
disadvantages of disparity, and recommends an appropriate course of action.   
This research is significant for members of the Air Force, DoD, and private 
citizens.  Air Force networks support close to three-quarters of a million users, including 
active duty service members, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard, civilians, and 
embedded contract employees (McCarter, 2003).  In addition to potentially affecting 
many people and the larger DoD network, base-level networks provide support to 
deployed warfighters and provide the environment to train, organize and equip our forces.  
Additionally, these networks provide critical information to key decision makers.   
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EXPLORATORY INQUIRY:  DISPARATE AIR FORCE BASE AREA 
NETWORK ARCHITECTURES  
 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 
Joint Vision 2020, the Department of Defense (DoD) blueprint for development 
and transformation, identifies information and technology as critical enablers for our 
nation’s military.  Currently, these key enablers provide a tremendous advantage over our 
adversaries and must be cultivated, protected, and employed effectively in the future 
(DoD, 2000).  Joint Vision 2020 calls for the development of a joint force capable of 
integrated information sharing to provide decision superiority, the ability to make and 
implement better decisions before enemies can react (DoD, 2000).  The synergy gained 
by the interdependence of the Services makes it clear that jointness is more than the 
simple combination of Service capabilities (DoD, 2000:42).  The following comment by 
the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, supports the guidance found in Joint 
Vision 2020 and highlights the importance of networks:   
“Possibly the single most transforming thing in our forces will not be a weapons 
system, but a set of interconnections and a substantially enhanced capability because of 
that awareness” (DISA, 2004).   
 
In order to provide the environment for decision superiority, Joint Vision 2020 
requires the development of a Global Information Grid (GIG); a globally interconnected, 
end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for 
collecting processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to 
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warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel (DoD 2000).  According to Mr. Rob 
Thomas, the Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, 
existing network architectures require transformation to provide warfighters with a 
globally integrated battle-space (Thomas, 2004).  Effective integration within the Air 
Force and across joint operating mission areas necessitates abandoning traditional 
barriers to take advantage of new technological capabilities (Thomas, 2004).  To achieve 
decision superiority, DoD systems must be interoperable, supportable, and exchange 
relevant information in a timely manner (DoD, 2004a:23).  An August 2002 Secretary of 
the Air Force policy memo tagged architectures as the “key construct in visualizing 
mission information relationships and promoting interoperability” (Cabrera, 2004).  To 
summarize, Joint Vision 2020 provides a roadmap for the development of a joint force 
capable of sharing information and integrated operations beyond the simple combination 
of capabilities (DoD, 2002).   A GIG will provide the information environment required 
by the joint force and outlined in Joint Vision 2020.  Establishment of a GIG requires 
transformation of existing network architectures.  The DoD and the individual services 
are currently taking action to increase interoperability and achieve optimal integration as 
outlined in Joint Vision 2020, the DoD blueprint for development and transformation 
(USSTRATCOM, 2004).  This study examines Air Force installation-level networks that 
contribute greatly to DoD interoperability and integration.  
Installation-level wide area and local area networks, WANs and LANs 
respectively, represent the lowest Air Force portion of the GIG and are critical to joint 
force interoperability and integration (Brewin, 1997).  The services cannot support the 
DoD blueprint for development and transformation without addressing installation-level 
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networks (Brewin, 1997).  Although the two previous citations are a few years old, the 
researcher believes these sentiments are still true today.  This research study explores 
these Air Force installation-level or base area network (BAN) architectures, referred to as 
BANs throughout this study.  In the context of this research study, the following 
definition defines a BAN: 
“The BAN provides interconnectivity within and between systems and networks 
in the defined campus area.  The BAN also provides access for the attached systems and 
networks to external networks, such as Non-classified Internet Protocol (IP) Network 
(NIPRNET), Secret IP Network (SIPRNET), and the Internet”  (AFCA, 2002).   
 
In this research study, the defined campus area is the area serviced by the local 
communications organization on a typical Air Force Base and identifies the BAN 
coverage area.  The campus area or BAN includes transmission facilities; switching and 
routing components; links from the backbone to buildings; interfaces to external and 
internal networks; and the components required to provide voice, data, and imaging 
(AFCA, 2002).   
In 1997, the Air Force program executive for battle management labeled 
installation-level networks or BANs as the service’s “Achilles’ heel” and promoted Air 
Force plans to establish standard BANs (Brewin, 1997).  This study investigates whether 
BANs are still the service’s “Achilles heel”.  Specifically, this study explores whether 
BANs are different throughout the Air Force, reasons for existing differences, and 
advantages and disadvantages of disparate networks.   
This research study follows a qualitative approach using a comparative multiple 
site case study and focused interviews to identify patterns and increase understanding 
concerning BANs.  Information is verified through triangulation, the researcher’s values 
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and bias are reported, and the nature of the research is exploratory.  The qualitative 
approach is appropriate for exploratory research efforts that report the researcher’s values 
and biases (Creswell, 1994).  
Background 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires the Department of Defense to establish 
and maintain sound and integrated information technology architectures (US Congress, 
1996).   Additionally, the nature of military engagement has changed; future wars will be 
fought with coalitions in a joint service environment (DoD, 2000).  Unilateral operations 
are a thing of the past.  The Clinger-Cohen Act mandate and a change in the nature of 
military engagements acknowledge the importance of the key enablers, information and 
technology, mentioned in the introduction.  Achieving the DOD goal of increased 
interoperability and integration by exploiting these key enablers fully requires each 
military service to ensure their respective service-level networks are interoperable and 
integrated (USSTRATCOM, 2004).  Air Force BANs are a key component of the Air 
Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) and provide a vehicle for mission information 
exchange between key functional areas supported by an Air Force Base.  Figure 1 reflects 
common BAN connections.  The figure shows a high-level example, but is not intended 
to show a complete set of connections supported by all BANs (AFCA, 2002).      
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Figure 1, Base Area Network High-level Operational Concept (AFCA, 2002) 
 
Air Force BANs evolved over the years from simple disjointed networks into 
intricate and essential components of a critical weapons system, the AFEN (DoAF, 
2004).  These networks provide the critical link between users, information, and 
technology in support of Air Force and joint operations (DoAF, 2004:4).  Accordingly, 
BANs directly affect our ability to fly, fight, and win (Williams, 2004).  The Combat 
Information Transport System (CITS) program effectively standardized the way 
individual bases connect to the larger AFEN; chapter II covers this program in more 
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detail.  However, BANs should receive more attention and focus because a loss of service 
for BAN users could result in mission failure at home or abroad.  A briefing provided to 
senior Air Force leaders in the communications field reflected the standardization of 
regional control centers, but failed to address installation-level networks (Bruns, 2004).    
According to a former director of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
shared, for far too long people just thought of BANs as plumbing, but they are critical 
part of the Defense Information Infrastructure (Brewin, 1997).  The researcher has 
encountered Air Force IT leaders that believe standardized BANs are critical to success, 
and others who believe BAN standardization holds less significance.  Base Area 
Networks are a vitally important element of enhancing combat strength through the 
synergy created by joining the strengths of individual components (AFCA, 2003).   
  The researcher has also encountered many IT leaders that believe unique mission 
requirements or local factors require the development of specialized systems.  This line of 
thinking is outdated and does not support Joint Doctrine requiring increased 
interoperability and integration.  In order to transform doctrine into operational 
capabilities, leaders must select synergy over specialization to achieve optimal effects.  
Solutions based on commercial open-systems technology should replace legacy systems 
whenever possible.  This study provides solutions and insight while recognizing the 
divergent environments and actions dictated by various missions, procurement strategies, 
and development histories present at bases throughout the Air Force.   
Research Significance  
This research is significant for members of the Air Force, DoD, and private 
citizens.  Air Force networks support close to three-quarters of a million users, including 
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active duty service members, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard, civilians, and 
embedded contract employees (McCarter, 2003).  Currently, the Air Force has 108 
connections into the DoD network enterprise (AFCA, 2004:10).  In addition to potentially 
affecting many people and the larger DoD network, BANs provide support to deployed 
warfighters and provide the environment to train, organize and equip our forces.  Today’s 
operating concepts require deployed personnel to obtain logistic and administrative 
support from home, referred to as reachback capability, and deployed locations (DoD, 
2003:1).  The term “battlespace” describes an environment where far removed 
participants and individuals on the battlefield both help shape the battlefield (AFCA, 
2003:7).  The battlespace construct recognizes the synergy achieved by reachback and 
distributed operations to increase situational awareness, flexibility, and speed of 
execution (AFCA, 2003:6).  Warfighters, regardless of their location, must be able to 
obtain and use intelligence from national and theater assets that may be widely dispersed 
(DoD, 2003).  The kill chain (find, fix, track, target, engage, and asses) is where networks 
as a weapons system can be most effective (Williams, 2004).  illustrates the kill chain and 
the enhancements provided by the GIG.  Base area networks play a pivotal role in 
executing the Air Force mission.  Base area networks provide critical voice, data, video, 
sensory, and imagery to decision makers (CITS, 2004).  In light of the facts mentioned in 
this paragraph, increased understanding and the development of BANs are very important 
and served as the catalyst for this research project.  
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Figure 2, Kill Chain 
 
According to former Secretary of the Air Force, James Roche, “We must preserve 
and enhance our ability to get and use quality, timely, actionable information to shorten 
the kill chain.” (Williams, 2004)  The United States of America is the only superpower in 
the world, but our nation is still vulnerable to threats now and in the future (DoD, 2000).  
Few adversaries will take on the United States military directly; however, they will 
attempt to offset our military superiority by exploiting information and technological 
vulnerabilities (AFCA, 2003).  Future success against enemies and discovering new 
capabilities depends heavily on our ability to share information and conduct integrated 
operations.  BANs provide a critical link between warfighters, technology, and the 
information required for mission accomplishment.  The Air Force estimates $5 billion in 
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network upgrades are required to implement Joint Vision 2020 capabilities 
(USAF/XORI, 2004).  Failing to manage base level resources effectively forfeits 
technological advances implemented at the Department of Defense, Air Force, and Major 
Command levels.   
This comparative multiple site case study, with accompanying focused interviews, 
provides benefits by uncovering and qualitatively validating valuable patterns and 
insights from the field.  Reviewing pertinent literature combined with the comparative 
multiple site case study results will increase the existing body of knowledge and provide 
a foundation for additional research.  The Department of Defense, Air Force 
Communications Agency (AFCA), Major Commands, Commanders, and individual 
service members will benefit from an increased understanding of BANs.  Specifically, 
Air Force infrastructure architects and planners will benefit from this research. 
The timing of this research is very significant.  In the summer of 2004, the Air 
Force Communications Agency transitioned the SCOPE Network mission to SCOPE 
EDGE.  The transition replaced a preventative maintenance and fine-tuning mission 
involving visits to every Air Force Base every 18 to 24 months with a new mission 
focused on achieving a consistent, sustainable, and cost-effective communications 
medium to support a seamless information grid (SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  Does the new 
focus remove a critical helping hand for base-level maintainers?  Will the new SCOPE 
EDGE mission be as successful as SCOPE Network?  Will the mission change have 
detrimental consequences?  Time will reveal the answers to these questions; this research 
provides a peek into BANs at this important juncture.     
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Research Questions 
The research objectives are to increase existing knowledge on the phenomenon of 
disparate Air Force BANs and to determine if the Air Force should standardize BANs, if 
the results reflect that BANs are indeed disparate.  This research provides insight and a 
foundation for leaders and managers to make BAN and AFEN related decisions.  To 
satisfy the research objectives, Chapter IV presents an analysis and discussion of the 
following investigative questions: 
1. Are BANs different throughout the Air Force?  If so, how? 
2. Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force? 
3. What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force? 
4. What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force? 
5. How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs? 
 
Research Propositions 
This study addresses the following research propositions according to the research 
model illustrated in Figure 3: 
1. Research will show BANs are different throughout the Air Force 
2. Research will identify sources of disparate Air Force BANs. 
3. Research will show advantages and disadvantages of disparate Air Force 
BANs. 
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Research Model 
Variable
BANs?
Why
Advantages 
of Variability AF
Response
Disadvantages 
of Variability
 
 
Figure 3.  Research Model 
 
Scope and Limitations 
The focus of this research study is Air Force base area networks (BANs) and 
whether the Air Force should take action to standardize these networks.  Deployable 
communications architectures are not covered.  The research objectives are to increase 
understanding and to elevate the importance of BANs; the critical interfaces between 
warfighters, everyday users, and critical information required to accomplish the mission.   
Specific equipment specifications and technologies are not explored, unless 
required to support the main research focus.  This research does not explore other 
military branches because their command structures and methods of addressing 
information technology depart greatly from the Air Force.  The other branches, 
commercial organizations, and government nonmilitary agencies present opportunities 
for additional research.   
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Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis is presented in five chapters followed by appendices and references.   
The current chapter introduces the research topic, provides background information, 
identifies the significance of the research, and highlights the scope and limitations of the 
research.  Chapter II provides and outline of the current Air Force information technology 
infrastructure and summarizes theoretical perspectives and previous research findings in a 
clearly defined literature review.  Chapter II also reviews existing literature and presents 
an overview of the CITS program and guidance from the Department of Defense and the 
Air Force.  Definitions, models, and research on related topics are included in the 
literature review.  Chapter III outlines the methodology.  This chapter describes how a 
multiple site comparative case study analysis with focused interviews is used in data 
collection and analysis.   Next, the results are analyzed in Chapter IV.   Finally, Chapter 
V features a discussion of the research results, itemizes the conclusions, promotes 
recommendations, and identifies areas for future research. 
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 II. Literature Review 
 
 
 Overview 
This literature review examines existing literature relevant to the scarcely 
researched topic of Air Force BANs.  The paramount goal of this chapter is to expand 
understanding provide a common frame of reference for this exploratory inquiry into the 
Air Force BANs.  Very little literature exists concerning base or installation level 
communications networks.  Accordingly, this chapter presents literature pertaining to the 
larger Air Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) and the base level networks; changes to the 
AFEN also affect the BANs.  To accomplish the chapter goal, this literature review is 
divided into four main sections.  First, the AFEN network architecture is described.  
Second, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Strategic Visions 2010, and 2020 are reviewed.  
Third, organizations that influence the AFEN structure are presented.  Fourth, other 
AFEN and BAN relevant topics, not fitting into the three previous sections, are covered.  
Air Force Enterprise Network Architecture 
Overview 
This section describes the structure and management components of the Air Force 
Enterprise Network.  First, a description of Air Force Base Area Networks (BANs) is 
presented.  Next, trust relationships and Windows NT domain models are discussed.  
Then, the structure of the AFEN is outlined, followed by a discussion of the three 
management levels.  Finally, the Air Force network operations command relationship is 
provided.  The goal of this section is to inform and establish a common understanding of 
the Air Force Enterprise Network Architecture.  
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Air Force Base Area Networks 
Deployed communications architectures are outside the scope of this study.  
However, it is important to note that fixed base communications networks provide critical 
home base support for deployed warfighters.  Home base networks also provide the 
environment to train, organize and equip information technology professionals prior to 
deployments.  Home networks if properly configured and maintained prepare our airman 
to successfully support warfighting operations in all arenas.     
Over 95 percent of voice, video, and data capabilities used by the Air Force to 
make force management and deployment decisions rely on cable, wireless, and fiber 
systems for intra-base network connectivity and information transfer.  However, the 
existing infostructure is insufficient to support the current and future requirements for 
integrated voice, data, video, imagery, and sensory information data transmission to 
operators, planners, and support personnel (USAF/XORI, 2004).  Local communications 
networks; providing voice, data, video, etc.; for non-deployed locations throughout the 
Air Force are referred to by the following names:  Base Information Transport System 
(BITS), Information Transport System (ITS), and Base Area Network (BAN).  This 
research study primarily uses BAN to describe these installation-level networks.  
Regardless of the name used, it is important to understand what constitutes a BAN.  Base 
area networks consist of the components, systems, and equipment that provide 
communications services for the local installation; it includes transmission systems, voice 
networks, data networks, building wiring, network interfaces, video services, and the base 
Network Control Center (NCC); the focal point for management of the local network, see 
Figure 4, Base Area Network.  The illustration shows a typical configuration.  The local 
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missions, environmental factors, and past history dictate configurations of BANs.  An Air 
Force briefing for senior leaders in 2003, described BANs as independent architectures 
and a smorgasbord of hardware (AETC, 2003).  Many of the systems that make up BANs 
are highly segregated preventing the desired level of interoperability.  The rapid 
evolution of computing power and networks has contributed to current state of BANs.  
The updated version of Moore’s Law, named after the co-founder of Intel and originally 
observed in 1965, states that computing power doubles every 18 months and will 
continue to do so for at least the next two decades (Intel, 2004).  Individual BANs come 
together to form the Air Force Enterprise Network, an Air Force-wide information 
environment. 
 
Figure 4, Base Area Network 
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Trust Relationships and Windows NT Domain Models  
A Windows NT domain organizes the resources from one or more servers into a 
single administrative composition (Locher, 1999).  Windows NT provides login 
privileges to the domain rather than to individual servers and Domain Administrators 
grant users access to a domain's resources (Locher, 1999).  Organizations may choose to 
establish multiple domains because the number of users or workstations is too large, 
departments need to manage their own resources, or the number of servers on a single 
domain is too large and effecting performance (Locher, 1999).  Trust relationships 
between domains allow administrators to manage multiple domains as a single 
administrative entity and only require users to login to a single domain (Locher, 1999).  
The next four sections outline the four existing Windows NT domain models:  Single, 
Single Master, Multiple Master, and Complete Trust. 
  Single Domain Model  
This model has a single domain with accounts and resources; provides advantages 
of centralized management of accounts and resources, does not involve any trust 
relationships and works best for small organizations (Windows, 2004).  Disadvantages 
are performance problems as the domain grows, lack of internal security divisions for 
units or divisions to reflect segments of a growing enterprise, and maximum of 40,000 
accounts (Windows, 2004).  
  Single Master Domain Model  
This model has a single account domain and multiple resource domains; provides 
advantages of departmental resource control based on resource domains, centralized 
account management, global groups (to many multiple accounts) are defined centrally in 
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account domain, and provides good solution for moderately sized networks (Windows, 
2004).  The number of trust relationships is based on the number of resource domains.  In 
order for this model to work well, account domain administrators must assign global 
groups to manage resource security; resource domain administrators should assign 
permissions to groups, not individuals; and number of accounts can not exceed 40,000 
(Windows, 2004).     
  Multiple Master Domain Model 
This model is an extension of the single master model; provides the following 
advantages:  accommodates any number of accounts by adding additional account 
domains, resources are locally and logically grouped to provide departmental-focused 
management, any master domain is capable of managing accounts, and provides a good 
solution for very large organizations (Windows, 2004).  The disadvantage is the 
complexity associated with the additional number of account domains and trust 
relationships (Windows, 2004).     
  Single Master Domain Model  
This model is a decentralized, high overhead environment consisting of a set of 
single domains with trusts relationships between each domain; advantages are scaleable 
for any number of users, each entity has full control over accounts and resources located 
in the same domain, and very useful for organizations without a Management 
Information Systems department (Windows, 2004).  The disadvantages are lack of 
centralized management, many trust relationships and associated complexity, and 
administrators must trust each other to manage accounts, resources, and privileges 
(Windows, 2004).    
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A single model described above or a combination of the models can be employed 
to manage networks (Locher, 1999).  Table 1 provides a summary of the Window NT 
domain models.   
Table 1, Domain Model Summary 
Domain Model Maximum 
Accounts 
Account 
Management 
Resource 
Management 
Trusts 
Single 40,000 Centralized Centralized No 
Master 40,000 Centralized Decentralized Yes 
Multiple Master Unlimited Centralized in 
Account Domains
Decentralized Yes 
Complete Trust Unlimited Decentralized Decentralized Yes 
 
Fixed base BANs are the focus of this research study, deployable communications 
architectures are outside the scope of this study.  The BANs provide fixed base 
communications services and represent a significant part of the Defense Information 
Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE), a plug and play, client server 
architecture that defines interfaces and how system components will interact.  The DII 
COE is fully compliant with DOD standards and guidance (AFCA, 1996).  Figure 5, Air 
Force’s System Domains (AFCA, 1996), shows how the services BANs provide for fixed 
base communications relate to other domains of the DII COE.  
 
 
 19 
 
DII COE
Airborne
Communications
Fixed Base
Communications
Space
Deployed
 
Figure 5, Air Force’s System Domains (AFCA, 1996) 
 
The purpose of the DII COE is to field systems with increasing interoperability 
and operational capability while reducing development time and life cycle cost.  The DII 
COE was developed in late 1993 and designed to eliminate design incompatibility among 
DOD systems (Carnegie, 2004).   
Air Force Enterprise Network 
The Air Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) is the Air Force-wide information 
environment that operates in a global context and is comprised of interoperable 
computing and communicating components that provide processing; information storage, 
dissemination, assurance, and transport; human interaction; and network management.  
The AFEN consist of all owned and leased communications and computing systems, 
software, and services; data; and security services required to accomplish the Air Force 
mission.  The AFEN encompasses 130 separate bases (Hoeft, 2004).  Figure 6, depicts 
the target architecture for the AFEN and how it fits into the larger DoD architecture.  As 
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mentioned in Chapter I, the Air Force has 108 connections to the DoD enterprise network 
(AFCA, 2004:10). 
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Figure 6, Target Architecture 
 
The AFEN is a part of the Global Information Grid (GIG), an information 
environment supporting the DoD, national security organizations, and intelligence 
community.  AFEN users, designers, and technicians must follow accepted standards 
whenever feasible to foster interoperability, assure mission success, commonality, and 
reduce cost of ownership (DoAF, 2000). The lowest level of the AFEN and the focus of 
this research study is the Air Force installation-level network architecture or BAN 
(DoAF, 2004:4).  
Successful Network Operations (NETOPS) provide effective, efficient, secure, 
and reliable information network services used in vital DOD and Air Force 
communications and information processes.  The Air Force NETOPS hierarchy is used to 
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manage the AFEN; this hierarchy adheres to the Defense Information Infrastructure 
Control Concept, a three tier DoD NETOPS hierarchy.   Within the Air Force NETOPS 
hierarchy, all three tiers are represented, as shown in Table 2.  Air Force NETOPS 
Hierarchy.    Within the DoD NETOPS hierarchy, the Air Force only has a presence at 
the regional and local tiers.  The Defense Information Systems Agency, global tier of 
DoD NETOPS hierarchy, has overarching responsibility for the military services and 
other DoD components, as reflected in Table 3.  DoD NETOPS Hierarchy.  Successful 
management of the AFEN through NETOPS provides high quality service to customers 
and satisfies increasing warfighter demands.  The paragraphs below Table 2 and Table 3 
discuss the three levels of the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy.    
Table 2.  Air Force NETOPS Hierarchy 
NETOPS Level Responsible Air Force Organization 
Global (Tier 1) Air Force Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC) 
Regional (Tier 2) Major Command (MAJCOM) NOSC 
Local (Tier 3) Network Control Center 
    
Table 3.  DoD NETOPS Hierarchy 
NETOPS Level Responsible Organization 
Global (Tier 1) DISA Global NOSC (GNOSC) 
Regional (Tier 2) MAJCOM NOSC, AFNOSC, other service and component NOSCs 
Local (Tier 3) Network Control Center 
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  Network Control Center 
The Network Control Center (NCC) represents the local level of Network 
Operations management within the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy, tier 3.  The NCC is the 
focal point for operation, maintenance, and management of all aspects of the BAN 
including Local Area Networks (LANs) and Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs) on a 
particular base.  The NCC provides support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  Personnel 
assigned to the NCC provide an on-site technical capability for network modifications 
and restorations of faulty equipment and circuits when directed by higher level Network 
Operations and Security Centers (NOSC).   
Prior to 2004, management of the AFEN was centered on base NCCs because the 
majority of supported systems were independently installed and created fragmented lines 
communications (DoAF, 1999).  NCCs provided the local network management expertise 
to offset the inherent obstacles associated with early networks.  Today, to provide 
effective, efficient, secure, and reliable information network services, management of the 
AFEN has evolved to the three network operations management tiers reflected in table 1.  
The explosive growth and increasing interconnectivity of networks and information 
systems making up the AFEN resulted in the change in management focus.   
   Major Command Network Operations and Security Center 
A Major Command (MAJCOM) is a major subdivision of the Air Force.  Each 
MAJCOM has a specific portion of the Air Force mission and is directly subordinate to 
Headquarters United States Air Force.  The Air Force is organized by MAJCOM 
functionally in the United States and geographically overseas (DoAF, 2003).  MAJCOM 
Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSC) represent the regional or mid-level 
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organization in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy, tier 2.  The MAJCOM NOSC provides 
real-time network intrusion detection, perimeter defense capabilities, and fault resolution 
activities.  Additionally, MAJCOM NOSC personnel monitor and support the daily 
operational issues of subordinate bases and units within their command.   
If this study determines that BANs throughout the Air Force are disparate, NOSC 
personnel will be particularly interested because disparate networks could lead to 
extended outages and loss of service due to unfamiliarity with various base architectures.  
Changing the focus for network management and troubleshooting from the NCC to the 
NOSC creates gaps between troubleshooters and the location of the outage, potentially 
preventing outage resolution.  Several independent studies report that over 80 percent of 
information technology system downtime is due to processes and people, not technology 
(Mossing, 2004).  This presents a difficult challenge for NOSC personnel attempting to 
guide local NCC personnel during the resolution of an outage caused by people or 
processes.  Geographic separation may hinder restoration efforts.   
    Air Force Network Operations and Security Center 
The AFNOSC is the highest Air Force NETOPS level, tier 1 or global level.  In 
the DoD NETOPS hierarchy the AFNOSC represents a region level, tier 2, see Table 3.  
The AFNOSC develops options and directs configuration and security posture changes in 
response to vulnerabilities and incidents, Joint Task Force direction, and outages that 
cross MAJCOMs, affect a majority of the AFEN or are time critical (DoA, 2004).  The 
AFNOSC directs the actions of subordinate NOSCs and NCCs when necessary.    
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Air Force Network Operations Command Relationship 
This section describes the command relationships established within the Air Force 
to accomplish effective management of the AFEN, Figure 7, Air Force NETOPS 
Command Relationships.  Each entity plays a significant role in providing reliable, 
secure, and on-demand communications services.  The relationships help ensure global 
systems interoperate without diminishing the authority of local commanders to direct and 
manage assets under their control (DoAF, 2004b).  
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Figure 7, Air Force NETOPS Command Relationships 
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  Eighth Air Force Commander 
The Eighth Air Force Commander (8 AF/CC) is designated the NETOPS 
commander and is responsible for NETOPS across the Air Force.  MAJCOMs are 
directly subordinate to Headquarters United States Air Force.  However, the 8 AF/ CC 
enforces compliance and has directive authority over MAJCOM units and assets.  
Directive authority is delegated to the Eight Air Force Vice Commander, the AFNOSC 
director. 
   Eighth Air Force Vice Commander 
The Eighth Air Force Vice Commander (8 AF/CV) is the Commander of Air 
Force Forces-Computer Network Operations and the director of the AFNOSC.  The 
commander ensures missions are performed in support of joint objectives and integrates 
NETOPS and computer network defense functions across the AFEN.  To ensure network 
availability and security, the commander directs configuration and security posture 
changes of NOSCs and NCCs in response to or in anticipation of events. 
    Air Force Network Operations and Security Center 
The AFNOSC is the highest tier in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy.  The 
AFNOSC provides senior leaders with global visibility of AFEN resources, performs 
system and network management, disseminates information, works with external 
agencies to resolve Air Force network anomalies and directs AFEN operational, security, 
and configuration changes (DoAF, 2004b).  Personnel assigned to the AFNOSC provide 
top-level technical assistance for IT professionals assigned to subordinate NOSC and 
base NCCs.  The AFNOSC has the following three divisions:  Command and Control 
(C2) division, Network Security division, and the Network operations division. 
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    Major Commands 
In order to accomplish their portion of the Air Force mission, MAJCOMs must 
maintain an effective and reliable network that provides communications services to 
assigned bases and resources.  Each of the eight MAJCOMs develops network 
procedures, policies, and standards for subordinate units.  Considerable coordination is 
required to ensure interoperability and compatibility between MAJCOMs and across the 
AFEN.  Additionally, each MAJCOM maintains a NOSC to provide command and 
control and NETOPS of their network assets.    
   Major Command Network Operations and Security Centers 
The mid-level organization in the three level Air NETOPS hierarchy is the 
MAJCOM NOSC.  This organization is a critical link in the daily operation of the AFEN.  
Personnel assigned to the MAJCOIM NOSC provide the commander with front-line 
network intrusion defense and real-time visibility of assigned network resources 
throughout the command.  MAJCOM NOSC personnel also provide NCCs with fault 
resolution support, engineering assistance, and visibility into NOSC managed devices.  
The NOSC also provides systems control, maintenance, and administration functions of 
the MAJCOM network (DoAF, 2004:22).  For example, the Air Combat Command 
(ACC), a large MAJCOM, NOSC manages one of the largest enterprises in the Air Force.  
The ACC NOSC provides network services to more than 110,000 users located across the 
command’s 15 Air Force bases (Mossing, 2004).  The Air Force is currently transitioning 
the focus for management of the AFEN from NCCs to NOSC.  How this transition is 
executed will determine if BANs are maintained to provide optimal performance, this 
study provides foundation research.  
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    Network Control Centers 
The NCC is the lowest level in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy.  They provide 
Wing commanders with visibility and command and control of the fixed base network.  
Personnel assigned to the NCC help achieve information assurance, oversee operation of 
the network, and perform maintenance and management of the base network.  The NCC 
provides an on-site technical capability to make physical network changes, modifications, 
and restoration of defective network transmission equipment and circuits when directed 
by the MAJCOM NOSC or AFNOSC.  Air Force NCCs are the heart of this research 
study because they provide the first level of management for BANs.  Regional control 
and management of networks, the new Air Force position, seems well suited for 
information assurance, update dissemination, and command and control.  However, fault 
resolution, quality of service, restoration of network transmission equipment may suffer 
if regional and global tier technicians aren’t familiar with the BANs their responsible for 
administrating.  This research study attempts to determine if variation is present in BANs 
throughout the Air Force and to explore the nature of any identified differences.    
     
Clinger-Cohen Act and Strategic Visions that Shaped the Air Force Enterprise 
Network 
Overview 
This section provides background information concerning the laws and strategic 
visions that began the transformation of Air Force and DoD network architectures from 
an assortment of vertical systems to an eventually robust and integrated critical weapons 
system, see Table 4, Law/Vision Timeline.  First, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 is 
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discussed.  Next, Joint Visions 2010 and 2020 are explored to provide a framework and 
common point of reference for this research study.  Finally, the DoD construct for 
logically improving interoperability is introduced.  This section highlights the importance 
of information and networks, identifies the joint interoperability mandate source, outlines 
the visions that initiated the DoD transformation, and provides a construct for improving 
interoperability. 
Table 4, Law/Vision Timeline 
CLINGER COHEN ACT 1996 
Clinger Cohen Act, Amendment 1998 
Joint Vision 2010 July 1996 
Joint Vision 2020 May 2000
 
  Clinger-Cohen Act 1996 
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 establishes and mandates the position of Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) for federal departments and agencies.  The act also sets 
guidance for acquisition and management of information resources.  An amendment to 
the Clinger Cohen Act requires the following: 
- Establishment of IT standards throughout the Department of Defense 
- Elimination of duplicate information technology systems within and between 
the military departments and Defense Agencies 
- Interoperability of IT and national security systems throughout the 
Department of Defense 
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The amendment assigned additional responsibilities to the Department of Defense 
and Military Department CIOs (Public Law 105-261).  The requirement to establish CIOs 
did not outline how to implement the new positions.  The military departments and the 
Marine Corps, a division of the Navy, selected different avenues for establishing the 
position of CIO.  The Army and Marine Corps have military officers.  Conversely, the 
Navy and Air Force have civilians.  Predictably, each service has distinct methods and 
procedures for installing, operating, and maintaining their respective networks.  
Joint Vision 2010 
Joint Vision 2010, released in July 1996, had a profound impact on the 
development of military capabilities by outlining an operational concept of joint 
warfighting (Brewin, 1997).  The doctrine provided a guiding template for the future 
direction of warfare; standardization represents the heart of the Joint Vision 2010 (DoD, 
2000a).  The vision initiated the process of military transformation and established a 
process for conducting joint experimentation and training (DoD 2000).  The document 
established a common framework and language for the services to develop and articulate 
their contributions to the joint force and placed emphasis on the ability to disseminate 
information quickly through networks (DoD, 2000).  As a result, network-centric 
warfare, “employing Information Age concepts to increase combat power in war and 
mission effectiveness in operations other than war” (DoD, 2001:37), became a central 
focus of military strategy.  Information technology managers in all three services 
believed in 1997 that the only way to transform network-centric warfare from a concept 
into reality is through the development of cohesive base-level and shipboard networks 
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rooted in commercial standards (Brewin, 1997).  This research study will increase 
understanding and focus attention on critical foundation level Air Force networks.  
  
Joint Vision 2020 
 
Joint Vision 2020 builds on the foundation established by Joint Vision 2010 and 
provides the overarching strategic vision for the continued transformation of our military 
services.  This document is essential to this research study because it defines a future 
information environment that fosters free and timely information sharing between all 
DoD components.  Base area networks, the focus of this study, provide the critical link 
between local users and other MAJCOM, Air Force, and DoD assets.  The updated vision 
calls for significantly improved interoperability to provide joint force capabilities beyond 
the simple combination of service capabilities.  The document’s primary focus is full 
spectrum dominance, the ability to operate alone or in combination with partners to 
defeat any adversary and control any situation, achieved through the interdependent 
application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full 
dimensional protection (DoD, 2000, p. 6).  Joint Vision 2020 identifies information 
superiority as a key enabler in the transformation of operational joint force capabilities, 
Figure 8, (Cohen, 1997). 
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Figure 8, (Cohen, 1997) 
 
Joint Vision 2020 also calls for the development of a Global Information Grid 
(GIG); a seamless, common user, information infrastructure; for a detailed definition, to 
provide the network-centric environment required to achieve information superiority 
(DoD, 2000).  Although the GIG alone does not guarantee interoperable DoD information 
systems, the architecture makes significant progress by providing the missing enterprise 
roadmap required for enabling interoperability among DoD systems (Miller, 2001). 
Organizations, doctrine, and training must evolve to realize the full potential of Joint 
Vision 2020, (DoD, 2000).   
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Level of Information Systems Interoperability Model 
Interoperability is a common theme found in the guidance provided by Clinger-
Cohen, Joint Vision 2010, and Joint Vision 2020.  The rapid evolution of information 
technology enables the commercial industry to field products faster then the policy bodies 
can prescribe standards (DoD, 1998).  Ironically, the same advances that dramatically 
enhance the inherent capabilities of information systems also compound the challenge to 
field systems that are interoperable with each other at comparable levels of sophistication 
(DoD, 1998).  The Level of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model, Figure 9, 
is used to increase integration and interoperability between DoD systems (Carney, 2004).  
The model provides a common basis for logical and incremental improvement (DOD, 
1998: ES-4).  The LISI model was developed by the C4ISR universal reference resources 
to define interoperability between information systems, provide a mechanism to measure 
the maturity of information systems, and outline a way to proceed from one level to the 
next (Clark, 1999).  The LISI model complements other initiatives that support the 
improved use of information system within the DoD, such as the Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII) Master Plan, DII Common Operating Environment, DoD Technical 
Reference Model, and the Joint Technical Architecture (replaced by the DoD Information 
technology Standards Register, DISR) (C4ISR, 1998).  
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Figure 9, LISI model (DOD, 1998) 
The model reflects five, zero thru four, increasing levels of sophistication 
regarding system interaction, the ability of the system to exchange and share information 
and services, and the associated computing environment; each higher level represents a 
progressive and demonstrable increase in capabilities (DOD, 1998).   
  LISI Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and Data Model 
Within the levels of the LISI model, many additional factors influence the ability 
of information systems to interoperate.  These factors are categorized into the following 
four attributes and illustrated in Figure 10:  Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and 
Data (PAID) (DOD, 1998).  Consideration and understanding the interrelationships 
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between all PAID attributes is required to improve interoperability beyond the simple 
connection of systems.   
 
Figure 10, LISI PAID Model (DOD, 1998) 
Alone, none of the PAID attributes sufficiently provides enough detail to 
complete a meaningful definition of interoperability, but each represents a critical, 
interdependent, and interlocking piece of the overall interoperability puzzle (DOD, 
1998).  Figure 11 demonstrates how the PAID attributes are used to describe and assess 
levels of interoperability (DOD, 1998).    
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Figure 11, PAID Attributes and Levels of Interoperability (C4ISR, 1998) 
At each level of the LISI model, a word highlights the most import aspect of the 
attributes.  The significance and relative impact of each attribute will vary by level 
(Clark, 1999).  One attribute serves as the primary enabler for achieving the different 
levels of interoperability (Clark, 1999).  Table 5 illustrates the primary enabling attribute 
for each level of the LISI model and provides a description of information exchange 
taking place at each level. 
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Table 5, LISI Primary Enabling Attributes (Clark, 1999) 
 
 
 
This study focuses on the infrastructure portion of the PAID model.  Accordingly, 
hardware, communications, and services are compared to determine if BANs are 
different.  Security is excluded because the CITS program effectively standardized a 
major portion of security through boundary protection initiatives.  
 
Organizations Affecting the Air Force Enterprise Network Structure 
Overview 
This section covers key positions or organizations that have an affect on the 
AFEN, but were not previously covered in the preceding sections concerning the AFEN 
network Architecture and Laws and Strategic Visions.  Table 6 provides an overview of 
the areas covered in this section.    
Table 6, Section Overview 
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 
Air Force Communications Agency 
Deputy Chief of Staff/Warfighting Integration 
Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics (HQ USAF/IL) 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
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Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) implements 
policies to advance interoperability and supportability of IT and National Security 
Systems (NSS) throughout the DoD.  This position highlights the importance on IT 
within the DoD and facilitates conflict resolution by providing a higher level authority for 
subordinate CIOs.  The DoD CIO is responsible for the development, implementation, 
and maintenance of the GIG as a sound integrated information technology architecture 
and ensuring that the Defense Information Systems Agency works with other DoD 
components to verify the interoperability and supportability of IT and NSS, (DoD, 2004).  
Defense Information Systems Agency 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the DoD executive agent for 
information standards; conducts interoperability assessment, test, and evaluations; and 
the single integrator for joint, coalition, and combined command and control.  The agency 
ensures a link is maintained between published standards and the acquisition system. The 
executive agent for information standards reduces redundancy by providing systems 
engineering, planning, program guidance and interoperability testing for DoD 
components.  DISA provides the DoD with global classified and unclassified voice, data, 
video, and transport services in manner that ensures US forces have access to 
information, geography, and space (DISA, 2004).    DISA also maintains the Defense 
Information Technology Systems Registry (DISR) consisting of approved IT standards 
and profiles to help acquisition and field interoperable and network-centric enabled 
systems and products.  The DISR provides mandatory standards and guidelines for the 
management, development, and acquisition of new or improved IT systems; guidance is 
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stable, technically mature, and publicly available. The DISR replaced the Joint Technical 
Architecture and provides a basis for seamless interoperability (DoD, 2004a).  The DISR 
is also covered later in this chapter under the DOD guidance section. 
Deputy Chief of Staff/Warfighting Integration 
The Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Director of Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) Infostructure (HQ USAF/XIC) provides oversight of requirements, plans, 
schedules, budgets, and performance criteria for Air Force communications and 
information modernization efforts (USAF, 2004).  This organization leads the 
development and implementation of communications and information architectures and 
represents the Air Force position for the development of joint architectures. 
Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics (HQ USAF/IL)  
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics, Directorate of 
Communications Operations (HQ USAF/ILC) is responsible for communications and 
information readiness and oversees the daily execution of Air Force communications and 
information programs and processes.  The directorate establishes course requirements and 
planning guidance for the professional development, education, and training of the 
communications and information workforce (USAF, 2004).   
Air Force Communications Agency 
The Air Force Communications Agency (AFCA) serves as the technical arm of 
Headquarters United States Air Force (HQ USAF); ensures integration and 
interoperability among command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems 
(AFCA, 2004a).  The agency acts as the policy and standards adjunct of HQ USAF and 
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the Air Force CIO and develops service level agreements with external organizations 
(USAF, 2004).  AFCA administers the Air Force Operationalizing and Professionalizing 
The Network (OPTN) program.   
Operationalizing recognizes the network as a mission critical system with 
operations that are fully integrated with mainstream Air Force processes.  
Operationalizing requires applying operational rigor to establish an environment that 
fosters mission readiness.  Warfighting needs drive the core requirements for 
operationalizing the network.  Operationalizing involves the following five key elements:  
readiness, inspections and evaluations, graduated response, operational reporting, and 
rules of engagement (AFCA, 2004c). 
Professionalizing the network is an operating approach that changes the way we 
train, organize, and equip to match the disciplined approach used with weapons systems 
that are more traditional.  Protected and rigorously engineered interoperable networks 
staffed by certified professionals can only satisfy the information requirements of Air 
Force leaders.  Standardizing Air Force network operations and management to align 
with Joint network operations and management efforts will enable Air Force forces to 
train as we fight (AFCA, 2004c).  This is perspective succinctly describes the importance 
of exploring the nature of Air Force BANs.  
  The agency ensures information infrastructure optimization by deploying strike 
teams globally for assured Air Force network combat power.  Strike teams either 
augment base or NOSC personnel to reconstitute failed or falling networks and provide 
targeted networking engineering expertise.  Additionally, base assistance teams assess 
compliance to standards and provide technical and optimization assistance.  During the 
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summer of 2004, AFCA changed the name and focus of their base assistance teams, from 
SCOPE Network to SCOPE EDGE; both build on the Scope Creek concept employed 
much earlier in Air Force history. 
   Scope Creek 
In 1968, Project Scope Creek was the first large-scale, precise system analysis 
conducted by highly skilled, specially trained engineers and Airmen (SCOPE EDGE, 
2004).  The exceptional success of Scope Creek led to its application in evaluating DoD 
worldwide communications and a substantial growth in the Scope Creek workforce.  By 
the end of 1975, the workforce grew to 40 teams with a total of 231 personnel positions 
(SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  Eventually, the term “Scope Creek” became an Air Force figure 
of speech meaning the systematic evaluation of a communications network (SCOPE 
EDGE, 2004).  The Scope Creek provided precision system analysis by expert 
technicians.  In 1997, AFCA resurrected the concept and applied it to modern technology 
in a preventive maintenance and fine-tuning capacity under term SCOPE Network 
(SCOPE EDGE, 2004). 
                      SCOPE Network 
 
From 1997 to the summer of 2004, AFCA SCOPE Network teams focused on 
optimizing and securing existing network work equipment at Air Force installations to 
achieve peak performance.  Ten five-person SCOPE Network teams traveled to every 
base in the Air Force every 18 to 24 months to perform the following tasks: 
- Tune base network for optimal performance 
- Enhance network security 
- Improve operations management 
- Train and mentor local information technology professionals 
- Identify and share best practices 
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- Respond to emergency situations, as required 
 
SCOPE Network teams provided a valuable tool for that produced immediate 
results.  In worst-case scenarios, team members discovered and restored base networks 
operating at one-tenth of capacity due to unnecessary software (Barry, 2001).  The very 
rapid deployment of Air Force networks through the 1980s and 1990s created the need 
for SCOPE Network (SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  Visiting locations on a yearly basis fostered 
the development of sound local operating procedures and continued the Scope Creek 
tradition of providing precision system analysis by expert technicians.    
                      SCOPE EDGE 
 
After several SCOPE Network visits, many bases improved to the point that 
additional visits provided diminishing returns (SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  Diminishing 
returns and the reorganization AFCA resulted in a fundamental shift in the SCOPE 
Network mission to support Air Force needs.  In 2004, SCOPE Network evolved to 
SCOPE EDGE in preparation for one of the largest overhauls of all Air Force networks in 
decades (SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  After the change, the network is viewed as an enterprise 
instead of a collection of 130 separate bases (Hoeft, 2004).  The EDGE in SCOPE EDGE 
stands for Enterprise, Design, Guidance and Evaluation.  SCOPE EDGE Teams continue 
the tradition of providing a valuable service by focusing on the following four mission 
areas:  base compliance assessments, NOSC network optimization, fielding Strike Forces 
to provide targeted network engineering expertise, and base optimization; a team is 
assigned to visit each MAJCOM (Hoeft, 2004).  Since evolving from SCOPE Network, 
base assistance visits have been cut back from 120 visits in a 18 month period to 30 visits 
in a 12 month period (SCOPE EDGE, 2004).  Teams perform a detailed remote analysis 
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before the actual visit to increase the value of time spent at the site.  An authoritative 
checklist is used to evaluate compliance with accepted architectures and standards. The 
SCOPE EDGE capability ensures the AFEN is run with rigor and discipline, through 
compliance assessment, while also addressing issues not covered by standards or policy, 
through optimization visits (NOSC, 2004).  Instead of mainly focusing on precision 
system analysis like its predecessor, SCOPE EDGE focuses more on “standardizing Air 
Force networks towards achieving a consistent, sustainable, and cost-effective 
communications medium to support a seamless information grid”, (SCOPE EDGE, 
2004).      
Air Force Enterprise Network and Base Area Network Relevant Topics 
Overview 
 
This section covers areas relevant to the AFEN and BANs.  Topics in this section 
do not fit neatly into any of the proceeding sections; however, the topics provide essential 
information covering the following:  Combat Information Transport System, Defense 
Information Technology Systems Registry, Global Information Grid, Air Force 
Instructions, Open Systems Strategy, and the Defense Standardization Program. 
Combat Information Transport System 
The Combat Information Transport Systems is a $4.7 billion HQ USAF level 
program for the acquisition, sustainment, implementation, and upgrade of high speed, 
broadband, and digital information transport assets that provide inter-base connectivity 
linking in-garrison command and control and combat support systems to the DoD 
Information Systems Network (Horn, 2004).  The centers of gravity for the CITS 
program are network connectivity, information assurance, asset management, 
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interoperability, and standard interfaces to joint service networks.  The program identifies 
BANs as a key enabler of the development of a DoD global communications network and 
a vital link between home base resources and warfighters deployed abroad (CITS, 2004).  
The Air Force Communications Agency administers the CITS program. 
The CITS program is charged with ensuring every active duty and reserve base 
has a BAN, referred to as Information Transport System by CITS, which links existing 
and future voice, data, video, imagery, and sensory systems.  The program provides full 
network interconnection to core buildings and backbone capacity capable of handling 
future, non-core building requirements.  The CITS program fields new capabilities using 
a block numbering system.  Specifically, an odd numbered block signifies a NOSC 
focused capability and an even numbered block signifies an NCC focused capability.  
Block 30 of the CITS program is designed to replace the aging network equipment on 
bases, standardize architectures, and move security boundaries from bases to NOSC 
(Horn, 2004).  Additionally, Block 30 will allow for commonality of architecture, 
equipment, and training (GD, 2003).  The CITS program management office provides 
specific, technical installation and implementation direction for BANs at each base.  
These directions are divided into the following three parts:  network, distribution systems, 
and internal wiring from the communications closet to the end user equipment (CITS, 
2004).       
Defense Information Technology Systems Registry (DISR)  
Department of Defense Directive 4630.5 and DoD Instruction 4630.8 establish 
responsibilities of CIOs and other components.  The documents define a capability-
focused, effects-based approach to information technology and national security system 
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interoperability and supportability across the DoD.  These directives mandate the joint 
technology leveraged foresight of Joint Visions 2010 and 2020.  This guidance requires 
the leaders of DoD components to ensure use and implementation of approved standards 
contained in a consolidated standards repository, the DISR, previously covered in this 
chapter under the DISA section.  The DISR replaced the Joint Technical Architecture; a 
document that defined the service areas, interfaces, and standards applicable to all DoD 
systems.  The instruction requires the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency to 
maintain the DISR, provide online access to the registry, and ensure the standards 
registry is linked to the acquisition system (DoD, 2004).  Information previously found in 
the Joint Technical Architecture makes up the backend database for web-based DISR 
applications (DISRonline, 2004).  The guidelines and standards found in the DISR are 
technically mature, stable, and publicly available at http://disronlin.disa.mil/ 
(DISRonline, 2004).   
Global Information Grid 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) called for in Joint Vision 2020 is the 
foundation for achieving information superiority by providing enterprise wide 
information services for DoD command and control, communications computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and e-business systems.  To provide 
interoperability, the GIG construct requires the integration of systems adhering to open 
systems standards.  When fully implemented the GIG provides a net-centric, globally 
focused information environment that facilitates information sharing among people, 
sensors, and weapon platforms (DoD, 2003).  The GiG provides capabilities from all 
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operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, and mobile platforms) and 
provides interfaces to coalition allied, and non-DoD users and systems (DoD, 2003:7). 
Air Force Instructions 
 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-133, Joint Technical Architecture-Air Force (JTA-
AF), tailors and refines core standards defined in the DoD Joint Technical Architecture.  
This instruction provides additional standards, standard profiles, recommended products, 
information technology architectures, and guidance not included in the DoD JTA (DoAF, 
2000).  An updated AFI referencing the DISR, replaced the DoD JTA needs to be 
published. 
Air Force Instruction 33-115, Volume 3, implements Air Force Network 
Operating Instructions (AFNOI), directive guidance network managers use during daily 
operations to maintain network software and equipment.  The AFNOIs provide detailed 
procedures and checklist for operating network components and responding to specific 
events (DoAF, 2004).  These instructions provide a flexible vehicle for providing 
standardized directive guidance to practitioners in the field. 
Air Force Instruction 33-115, Volume 1, Network Operations, provides the 
policy, direction, and structure of the AFEN.  The instruction implements the AFNOSC 
reporting structure and provides the guidance necessary to manage the increasingly 
complex network environment to provide a cohesive Air Force network.  This AFI 
assigns responsibilities from the AF CIO down to the local base units.   
Open Systems Approach to Weapon System Acquisition 
The open systems strategy employs modular design tenets and uses widely 
supported and consensus based standards for key interfaces to develop an affordable and 
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adaptable information system (DAG, 2004).  Under the open systems initiative, 
equipment is not standardized, but a standard information architecture and standard cable 
attachments are required to permit interfacing with existing equipment (DoD, 2000a:22).  
The open systems strategy offers tremendous flexibility by providing a standardized 
“plug and play” capability among physical and electronic interfaces, while allowing 
equipment upgrades to keep pace with technological advances (DoD, 2000a).  This 
approach supports achieving the following four benefits:  1) reduced acquisition cycle 
time and overall life-cycle cost, 2) ability to insert cutting edge technology as it evolves, 
3) commonality and reuse of components among systems, 4) increased ability to leverage 
commercial investment (DoD, 2000a).  
The Open System Joint Task Force (OSJTF) was chartered as a cooperative effort 
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense with the 
purpose to sponsor and accelerate the adoption of an open system approach for new 
systems and system upgrades (DLA, 2004).  The OSJTF does not attempt to dictate the 
use of common hardware everywhere; the task force seeks to standardize to each unique 
need while retaining the advantages of common architecture and major interfaces (DLA, 
2004).   
Defense Standardization Program 
The Defense Standardization Program (DSP) is conducted under the statutory 
provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain a standardization program for 
the following areas of focus (DoD, 2000a): 
1. Standardizing like procedures and technologies 
2. Using a common set of specifications and standards 
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3. Cooperating with industry in the development of standards 
4. Assigning standardization responsibilities in the DoD 
5. Resolving disputes between the Military Departments and Defense Agencies 
6. Making final decisions in all DSP-related matters 
This research is primarily concerned with areas 1 and 2 above.  Standardization is 
an enabling strategy for achieving the Joint Vision goals to provide the warfighter with 
interoperable, reliable, and technologically superior equipment (DoD, 2000a:10).  
Interoperability, information superiority, and the rapid application of new technology 
represent key areas of the Joint Vision doctrine and depend on standardization to be 
successful (DoD, 2000a).  The goals of the DSP are (DoD, 2000a): 
1. Improve military operational readiness by achieving interoperability, 
improving logistical support, improving reliability, and modernizing 
existing systems.  
2. Reduce costs by reducing number of nonstandard parts, facilitating 
competition, promoting use of common process and open systems, 
promoting standard commercial processes and practices, reducing training 
costs, and reaching a consensus on requirements to optimize systems 
engineering. 
3. Reduce replenishment cycle time by using standard items and identifying 
interchangeability and interoperability requirements to facilitate the rapid 
introduction of new technologies. 
The DSP concedes that standardization is not always desirable.  It may not be 
practical or desirable to standardize when the technology involved is rapidly evolving and 
acquiring the desirable state-of-the-art solution or items go out of production after a short 
period of time (DoD, 2000a).   This describes the nature of BANs and information 
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technology components.  In these instances, it may be beneficial to standardize interfaces 
or protocols by pursuing an open systems strategy (DoD, 2000a). 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter II presented a literature review of topics related and important to whether 
the Air Force should standardize BANs at installations across the service, the topic of this 
research project.  The literature review established a framework and common perspective 
for this research project. 
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 III.  Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the process used to answer the research and investigative 
questions, presented in chapter I of this research study.  This chapter discusses the 
qualitative research approach, role of the researcher, rationale for selecting the case study 
methodology, case study research design, quality of the research design, data collection, 
data analysis, and research limitations.  This research project uses a multiple site case 
study methodology to examine Air Force BANs.  Documented base assistance team visits 
and focused interviews provide the data for analysis. 
Qualitative Approach 
The qualitative study is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human 
problem conducted in a natural setting (Creswell, 1994).  The following three factors 
determine the appropriate research approach: research problem, personal experiences of 
the researcher, and the audience (Creswell, 2003:22).  The qualitative approach is 
appropriate to investigate exploratory research problems by researchers with experience 
in literary writing and intending to present their results to practitioners (Creswell, 2003).  
In this study, the research problem is exploratory, the researcher has experience in 
literary writing, and the target audience is practitioners in the field of information 
technology. 
In addition to the guidance provided by Creswell, other researchers provide 
parameters for selecting the qualitative approach.  According to Leedy, a case study is a 
type of qualitative research in which information is gathered about a single or multiple 
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cases to learn more about an unknown or poorly understood state of affairs (Leedy, 
2001).  Yin offers, case studies investigate contemporary problems within real-life 
context to account for pertinent influences on the research topic (Yin, 1994).  This study 
examines the little understood topic of Air Force BANs, a contemporary problem, in a 
natural environment.  According to “Moores Law”; named after Gordon Moore, a co-
founder of the computer chip maker Intel; available computing power doubles every 18 
months, (Intel, 2004).  Rapid changes in technology, AFEN size, and decentralized 
growth across the Air Force contribute to the current lack of understanding BANs.  The 
goal of this research is to add to the body of knowledge concerning Air Force BANs by 
examining existing literature and documented visits to three separate locations and 
interviewing information technology professionals. 
Role of the Researcher 
The qualitative researcher’s sustained involvement with participants introduces a 
range of strategic, ethical, and personal issues into the research process.  Researchers 
should explicitly identify their biases, values, and personal interests about their research 
topic, including past experiences that enable the audience to better understand the topic, 
setting, or participants (Creswell, 2003:184).  To improve quality, use your own prior 
expert knowledge in your case study (Yin, 2003:137).  The researcher has twelve years 
experience working in various base level communications positions at four different 
locations.  He managed the infrastructure element of a base NCC on an installation 
visited by an Air Force Communications Agency base assistance team; the team provided 
significant technical support and guidance for future enhancements.  The researcher does 
not have a direct connection or previous experience with any of the three documented trip 
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report locations examined in this study.  The researcher is believes the current move 
towards regional control and network management of Air Force networks lacks adequate 
attention on local level support.  Failing to address this concern may lead to extended 
outages, derogated service, interrupted information sharing, and ultimately prevent 
mission accomplishment. 
Case Study Rationale 
 This study uses the case study strategy and focused interviews.  The case study is 
especially suitable for learning more about a poorly understood situation (Leedy, 2001).  
Use the case study strategy when the research satisfies the following three conditions: the 
research questions must be in the form of how or why, the researcher must not have any 
control over events, and the study must focus on a contemporary event or problem (Yin, 
1994).  This study fulfills all three conditions.  The investigative questions are in the 
required form, the research investigates an exploratory question about a contemporary 
problem, and the researcher has no control over the events.  The documented base 
assistance team visits were conducted prior to the start of this research.  The following 
three sections detail how this research study satisfies the conditions cited in this 
paragraph and listed in Table 7. 
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Table 7, Strategy for Research Design (Yin, 1994) 
 
Form of Research Question 
Research questions take one of the five following basic forms:  how, why, what, 
who, and where (Yin, 1994).  The first three forms apply to this research and support the 
case study strategy.  Research questions taking the form of how and why are explanatory 
and support using the case study, historical and experimental research strategies (Yin, 
1994).  Research questions in the form of what are either exploratory or prevalence and 
support all of the strategies or surveys and archival analysis, respectively (Yin, 1994).  
Whom and where research questions support strategies other than case study, as reflected 
in Table 7.  The investigative questions used to address the main research question in this 
study are in the form of how, why, and the exploratory what. 
Extent of Control 
Lack of researcher control over events is an important characteristic of case study 
research; see Table 7, (Yin, 1994).  This study uses previously completed base assistance 
team reports, focused interview transcripts, and a review of existing literature.  Therefore, 
the study satisfies the case study extent of control guidelines.  Additionally, interviewees 
reviewed transcripts for accuracy and correct interpretation.   
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 Focus 
Case study is the preferred research strategy when asking how and why questions, 
the researcher has little control over events, and the focus is on a contemporary rather 
than a historical issue (Yin, 1994:1).  Case study data collection methods include the 
following:  interviews, documentation, and observations (Leedy, 2001:157).  In this 
research study; the research questions are in a favorable format, the focuses is on a 
contemporary Air Force problem, and the data collection methods include documentation 
and interviews. 
Research Design 
The research design is the logical sequence that ties the research data to the initial 
research questions and, eventually, to the conclusions of the study (Yin, 1994:19).  The 
design determines what questions to study, what information is relevant, what to collect, 
and how to analyze the research results (Yin, 1994:20).  An exploratory case study should 
define what is explored, the purpose of the exploration, and the criteria used to determine 
if the exploration is successful (Yin, 1994:29).  This study explores BANs on established 
Air Force bases.  The purpose of this exploration is to provide leaders and managers with 
sound information for making current and future BAN related decisions.  This 
exploration is successful if it addresses the research propositions, facilitates greater 
understanding, and generates interest for additional research.  The following five research 
design components are particularly important to the case study research strategy:  
research questions, research propositions, units of analysis, logic linking between data 
and research propositions, and criteria for interpreting the results (Yin, 1994:20).  
Sections below reflect how this study addresses each component. 
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Research Questions  
This section outlines the main research question, investigative questions, and 
research propositions, originally introduced in Chapter I.  A latter section of this chapter, 
the Data Collection section, contains the interview questions. 
 Main Research Question 
Should the Air Force Standardize Base Area Networks?  
  Investigative Questions 
6. Are BANs different throughout the Air Force?  If so, how?   
7. Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force? 
8. What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force? 
9. What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force? 
10. How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs? 
 
 Research Propositions and Model 
4. Research will show BANs are different throughout the Air Force 
5. Research will identify sources of disparate Air Force BANs. 
6. Research will show advantages and disadvantages of disparate Air Force 
BANs. 
7. Research will identify an appropriate AF response to current state of BANs. 
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Figure 12, Research Model 
 
Research Procedures 
This section illustrates the procedures used to answer each research question.  The 
answer to the main research question is inferred by reviewing answers to each of the 
investigative questions.  The first investigative question is the linchpin of the study.  In 
order to answer this key question, documentation in the Base Assistance Team site report 
for each location and information obtained during interviews are compared base on the 
infrastructure attribute of the LISI model, introduced in chapter II.  The table below 
identifies how each investigative research question is addressed.  Interview questions are 
listed later in this chapter under the Data Collection section.     
Table 8, Research Procedures 
Investigate Question Method of address 
1 AFCA Base Assistance Team (BAT) Trip Report, Interview 
Question 1, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature Review.  
2 Interview Questions 3 and 4, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature 
Review 
3 Interview Question 6 and Cross Case Analysis 
4 Interview Question 5 and Cross Case Analysis 
5 Interview Question 7, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature Review 
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Unit of Analysis 
Accurately specifying the primary research questions facilitates selecting the 
appropriate unit of analysis (Yin, 1994:23).  The unit of analysis determines what the 
“case” is (Yin, 1994:21).  Fixed BANs at established Air Force installations are the units 
of analysis for this study, not deployable or contingency networks.  Key participants 
include personnel assigned to the local Network Control Center on each installation.      
Logic Linking of Data to Propositions 
Interpreting data in terms of common themes and synthesizing data into an overall 
portrait of the cases are methods of processing case study information (Leedy, 2001:157).  
“Pattern-matching”, linking information from cases to propositions, is a promising 
method of linking case study data to the research propositions (Yin, 1994:25).  This study 
examines information from each case to identify support or lack of support for each 
research proposition.  Cross-case analysis is used to identify any similarities, differences 
and common themes. 
Criteria for Interpreting Results 
Analyzing case study evidence is one of the least developed and most difficult 
aspects of conducting case study research (Yin, 2003).  The following three general 
analytic strategies and five specific techniques can be used to process case study evidence 
(Yin, 2003):   
General Analytic Strategies 
- Relying on theoretical propositions 
- Setting up a framework based on rival explanations 
- Developing case Descriptions 
 
Specific Analytic Techniques 
- Pattern matching  
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- Explanation building 
- Time-series analysis 
- Logic models 
- Cross-case synthesis 
 
The analytic strategy sets the priority for what to analyze and why (Yin, 2003).  
This study relies on theoretic propositions, pattern matching, and cross-case synthesis to 
analyze evidence.  The theoretic propositions; Air Force BANs are disparate, sources of 
disparity, and advantages and disadvantages of disparity; form the general analytic 
strategy.  The specific analytic techniques used are pattern matching and cross-case 
synthesis.  Theoretic propositions and the Level of Information System Interoperability 
(LISI) model provided data collection parameters.  Specifically, locations are compared 
for variability based on the range of considerations associated with the infrastructure 
attribute of the LISI model, see the LISI sub-section of Ch II for a detailed explanation.  
Quality of Research Design 
The following four tests determine the quality of any case study research effort:  
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 1994:33).  
Table 9, summarizes the tests and tactics used to satisfy research design requirements 
during various phases.  The four subsequent sections address how each test is satisfied in 
this research study. 
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Table 9.  Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Yin, 1994:33) 
 
Tests 
 
Case Study Tactic 
Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity • Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Establish chain of evidence 
• Have key informants review draft case 
study report 
data collection 
data collection 
Internal validity 
 
 
• Do pattern-matching 
• Do explanation-building 
• Address rival explanations 
• Use logic models 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
External validity • Use theory in single-case studies 
• Use replication logic in multiple-case 
studies 
research design 
research design 
Reliability • Use case study protocol 
• Develop case study database 
data collection 
data collection 
 
Construct Validity 
The first test, construct validity, consists of establishing the correct operational 
measures for the investigated concepts and is especially problematic in case study 
research.  Case study critics point to the fact that investigators fail to sufficiently develop 
an operational set of measures and that subjective judgments are used to collect data 
(Yin, 1994:34).  Table 9 lists the following three tactics for increasing construct validity:  
multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence, and key informant review 
(Yin, 2003:34).  This study employs all three tactics.  Multiple cases and focused 
interview transcripts provide multiple sources of evidence.  The researcher received 
documentation, trip reports, directly from the Air Force Communications Agency and 
documented interview transcripts to establish a chain of evidence.  Key informants, 
practitioners working in base level communications positions, reviewed the case study 
report and interviewees reviewed interview transcripts for accuracy and correct 
interpretation.   
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Internal Validity 
The second test, internal validity, involves establishing causal relationships, 
certain conditions lead to other conditions.  This type of logic is inapplicable to 
descriptive or exploratory studies (Yin, 1994:35).  Internal validity for case study 
research extends to the bigger problem of making inferences; is the evidence convergent 
and are the inferences correct (Yin, 1994)?  Table 9 identifies the following four tactics 
for increasing internal validity:  pattern matching, explanation building, address rival 
explanations, and logic models.  This research study uses pattern matching. 
External Validity 
The third test, external validity, deals with knowing whether a study’s findings are 
applicable beyond the immediate case study, replication (Yin, 1994).  Table 9 identifies 
theory in single case studies and replication logic in multiple-case studies as tactics for 
increasing external validity.  This research examines multiple cases by exploring BANs 
at five locations, three with documented trip reports and two where key informants are 
currently stationed.  Accordingly, replication logic is used to increase external validity.  
Key informant interviews, outside the three select trip report locations, were conducted to 
improve the overall applicability of results.   
Reliability 
The forth and final test, reliability, deals with demonstrating the operations of a 
study are repeatable and will provide the same results and conclusions if a subsequent 
investigator follows the same procedures in conducting the same case study (Yin, 
1994:36).  The goal of reliability is to minimize the biases and errors in a research study 
(Yin, 1994:36).  Table 9 reflects the following two tactics for increasing reliability:  use 
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of a case study protocol and development of case study database.  In this study, 
documenting research procedures is used to increase reliability.   
Data Collection 
In qualitative research, purposeful selection of participants or sites provides the 
best opportunity for the researcher to address the research questions (Creswell, 
2003:185). This logic is in contrast to random sampling or the selection of a large number 
of participants typically found in quantitative research (Creswell, 2003).  This 
exploratory inquiry uses documentation specifically focused on BANs and focused 
interviews of personnel with practical experience in base level communications.   
Qualitative data collection steps include setting the boundaries of the study, 
collecting information through unstructured (or semi-structured) observations and 
interviews, documents, and visual materials (Creswell, 2003).  This study uses 
documentation and focused interviews for data collection.  Five personnel at each of the 
documented trip report locations are interviewed as well as key informants at two other 
locations.  Only personnel with networking experience at more than one location will be 
interviewed.  Air Force Communications Agency, base assistance team, final trip reports 
are the form of documentation used.  The following semi-structured interview questions 
address the research questions and propositions:   
1. Are base area networks throughout the Air Force the same or different?  Support 
for your reply? 
 
2. The Air Force CIO, Mr. John Gilligan, created the Standards Council to help 
reduce the variability found in base area network architectures throughout the Air 
Force.  Do you think base area networks should look the same or similar?  Why or 
why not?    
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3. What do you feel are the primary reasons base area networks across the Air Force 
are configured, arranged, and equipped differently? 
 
4. Why is there so much variation concerning base area networks throughout the Air 
Force? 
 
5. What are the advantages of employing a variety of network architectures at bases 
throughout the Air Force? 
 
6. What problems are created by employing a variety of network architectures at 
bases throughout the Air Force? 
 
7. How do you think the Air Force should respond to the current state of base area 
networks? 
 
 
Pilot interviews resulted in the creation of interview question one to directly 
addresses whether BAN architectures are different throughout the Air Force.   Previously, 
the researcher assumed they were different based on personal experience.  In contrast, 
some pilot interviewees believed BANs are relatively the same or didn’t know. 
Question Development 
The main research question, investigative questions, and the research propositions 
were used to develop the interview questions.  Interview questions were developed to 
ensure collected data adequately covered the research objectives.  Table 10, identifies 
how each interview question is related to a research question or proposition.    
Table 10, Interview Question Development 
Interview 
Question 
Supported Investigative 
Question(s) Supported Proposition(s) 
1 Investigative 1 1 
2 and 7 Investigative 5 4 
3 and 4 Investigative 2 2 
5 Investigative 4 3 
6 Investigative 3 3 
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Interview question number 1 supports the first investigative question and the first 
research proposition by revealing the interviewee’s view on the whether BANs 
throughout the Air Force are disparate, or not.  This question was not included in the 
initial interview questions; it was added after several test interviews.   
Interview questions 2 and 7 solicit input concerning what should be done about 
disparate Air Force BANs to address the fifth investigative question and the fourth 
research proposition.  These questions were developed based on input from test 
interviews.  Interview question 2 establishes the interviewee’s position on the desirability 
of standard networks.  Question 7 asks what should be done about the current state of 
BANs, regardless of whether the interviewee believes them to be disparate or not.       
Interview questions 3 and 4 support the second investigative question and the 
second research proposition by attempting to identify sources of BAN variation.  
Question 3 constrains the inquiry to configuration, arrangement, and equipment.  
Question 4 employs no limitation and is designed to capture a broader range of responses. 
Interview question five addresses the fourth investigative question and the third 
research proposition by identifying the advantages of variety.  This question is the polar 
opposite of interview question 6. 
Interview question 6 supports the third investigative question and the third 
research proposition by identifying problems encountered due to variation in BANs 
throughout the Air Force.   Interviewees were encouraged to include any experiences 
prior to their current duty assignment. 
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Key informant feedback led to the development of interview question 1, 4, and 7.  
Question 1 and 7 help address the fifth investigative question more directly and question 
4 provides an additional opportunity to capture data for investigative question 2 and 
proposition number 2.   Practitioners assigned to an NCC not included in this research 
study reviewed the interview questions and provided input for restructuring questions. 
Responses to the interview questions reflect the views of seasoned professionals 
responsible for maintaining Air Force BANs during at least two assignments. 
Pre-interview Procedures 
The nature of the topic restricted the pool of potential interviewees to individuals 
having knowledge of BANs.  Accordingly, the researcher interviewed personnel working 
at base NCCs.  To reduce any bias, interviewees were not told the nature or goal of the 
study.  Participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous.  Interview questions were 
provided to participants at least 24 hours in advance.  Each participant signed the 
informed consent letter prior to the start of the interview and provided an email address to 
facilitate review and approval of their responses.  Any requested modifications received 
via the email feedback loop were accomplished before any answers were analyzed.  
Participants were offered a copy of the final report.      
Data Analysis 
Data analysis involves examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
processing the evidence to address the initial research propositions of the study (Yin, 
1994:102).  The following two general strategies help investigators choose among 
different techniques and to complete the analytic research phase successfully: relying on 
theoretical propositions and developing a case description (Yin, 1994:103).  Within the 
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general strategy, the following four analytic techniques should be used:  pattern 
matching, explanation building, time series analysis, and program logic (Yin, 1994:102).  
A fifth technique, cross-case synthesis, applies specifically to analyzing multiple cases; 
having more than two cases strengthens the findings much more than if produced by one 
case (Yin, 2004:133).  This research study relies on theoretical propositions for the 
general analytic strategy and pattern matching and cross-case synthesis as the specific 
techniques. 
Theoretical Propositions 
Theoretical propositions help to focus attention on certain information and to 
ignore other information (Yin, 1994:104).  The propositions introduced in Chapter 1 and 
earlier in this chapter shaped the data collection and analysis of this research project.  The 
purpose of this study is to increase existing knowledge concerning BANs.  The 
theoretical propositions directed the exploration of BANs with a focus on key areas.  
Pattern Matching 
Pattern matching, comparing a empirically based pattern with a predicted pattern, 
is one of the most desirable case study analysis strategies (Yin, 1994:106).  This study 
compares patterns from multiple cases and focused interviews.  The details of the 
comparison are included in chapter IV. 
Key Informant Review 
Interviewees reviewed transcripts prior to data analysis.  Key informants reviewed 
the case study for validity and logic.  The key informant review increased the internal 
validity and reliability of this research effort.  
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Cross-case Synthesis 
Five sites are compared during this research study.  Three cases have documented 
trip reports and two locations where selected because they are the current duty stations of 
key informants.  Locations are compared based on the range of considerations associated 
with the infrastructure attribute of the LISI model.  Additionally, interview responses are 
compared across locations. 
Research Limitations 
There are several limiting factors for this research study.  First, the size of the 
AFEN is a limiting factor.  The Air Force has at least a semi-permanent communications 
presence at over 120 locations worldwide.  This study examines BANs at five locations 
in detail to find indicators that apply to the larger AFEN.  Sites were selected with 
diversity in mind and include the following:  Air National Guard Base, Oversea 
installation, and continental United States bases.  Second, little research exists on the 
specific area of BANs.  As a result, there is not much to build upon.  Third, the fluid 
nature of information technology poses a significant hurdle for conducting research; the 
information technology environment changes rapidly.  Fourth, this study will not produce 
results comparing similar locations; this is an opportunity for additional research.  Fifth, 
Time represents the final major limitation of this study.  The importance and complexity 
of this study demand more time than this effort can provide.  Despite these limitations, 
this research makes a contribution to current understanding.  This study aims to establish 
grounds for additional research.        
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the process used to answer the research questions 
presented in Chapter I of this research study.  This chapter discussed the qualitative 
research approach, role of the researcher, rationale for selecting the case study 
methodology, case study research design, quality of the research design, data collection, 
data analysis, and research limitations.     
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 IV. Analysis 
  
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the results of the exploratory research methodology 
outlined in Chapter III.  The research model, figure 13, represents the logical map 
followed in attaining the results; convergent sources of information were used.  The 
results are based on documented AFCA SCOPE Network Reports, focused interviews of 
network professionals, and a detailed literature review.  This chapter is presented in five 
primary sections.  First, support for conducting this research effort is presented.  Second, 
the case study report section describes the sites included in this study.  Third, an 
overview of the interview data is presented.  Fourth, each investigative question is 
answered and summarized.  Fifth, the main research question is addressed.  A total of five 
sites are used in this study to address five investigative questions and answer the main 
research question; documented trip reports were available for three locations and focused 
interviews were completed at four locations. 
 
 
Figure 13, Research Model 
 
 
Variable
BANs?
Why
Advantages 
of Variability AF
Response
Disadvantages 
of Variability
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Support for Conducting Current Research  
As an initial step in the interview process, question two was asked and analyzed.  
Responses were split pretty evenly regarding whether interviewees BANs should be the 
same or similar across the Air Force; results indicate a lack of a clear consensus among 
practitioners.  
Interview Question 2 
• The Air Force CIO, Mr. John Gilligan, created the Standards Council to help 
reduce the variability found in base area network architectures throughout the 
Air Force.  Do you think BANs should look the same or similar?  Why or why 
not? 
 
Fifty seven percent of the interviewees spread over three locations stated BANs 
should be the same, four out of seven.  Forty-three percent, three of seven, all from site 
two said BANs should be similar but not the same.  Even though clear preference didn’t 
emerge from the raw results, all three very experienced key informants and the most 
experienced non-key informant think BANs should look the same.  The personnel 
interviewed at site two, reported BANs should be similar, are the least experienced in the 
pool of interviewed personnel, see Table 13 Interview Demographics.  Table 11 provides 
a complete summary of interview question two responses.  Some thoughts from the 
majority that think BANs should be the same are listed below:   
• Need a common NCC solution for core services  
• Common baseline infrastructure solution that is developed, funded, and 
implemented from the highest level 
o This concept allows knowledge gained at one base to be directly 
applicable to other bases   
• AF should franchise the process of providing communications and network 
services.  Would easily provide NOSC with site specific base configurations 
• Approval for exceptions should be centrally managed  
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The minority who feel BANs should look similar shared a rationale centered on 
the concept of security through diversity.  They feel that disparate BANs increase 
security by making it more difficult for intruders to gain unauthorized access.  After 
completing this initial step, further research is clearly justified. 
Table 11, Interview Question 2 Response Summary 
Response Summary 
Questions 2  Interviewee(s) 
# of 
Individuals
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Same  3, K1, K2, K3 4 57 3 
Similar 2A, 2B, 2C 3 43 1 
 
Site Descriptions  
This section provides a description of the five sites selected for this exploratory 
research project.  Purposeful selection of participants or sites provides the best 
opportunity for the researcher to address the research questions (Creswell, 2003:185). A 
desire to better understand BANs, a very scarcely researched topic, influenced site 
selection.  Sites 1 through 3 were selected for this study because the sponsoring agency 
provided documented trip reports and the sites provide good examples of current 
installations according to network size; small, medium, and slightly large.  Two 
additional trip reports were provided by the sponsoring agency for locations with small 
networks; these sites were not selected for this study because the researcher did not want 
to over influence the results with small network characteristics.  Sites 4 and 5 were 
selected because the three key informants used in this study are currently stationed at 
either Site 4 or Site 5.  The sites used in this study include four locations in the 
continental United States and one overseas location; at least one Air National Guard base 
is included.  Information reflected in this section is based on SCOPE Network trip reports 
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to Sites 1 thru 3 in calendar year 2003 and focused interviews of personnel at four of the 
five locations, Site 1 personnel were not interviewed.  The BANs at the sites are 
maintained by military, government civilians, and contract personnel.   
Site 1  
Site 1 has approximately 2,000 user accounts and a vendor A provided 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) backbone with vendor B distribution switches.   
Servers running Window NT 4.0 provide network services, with two DNS Windows 2K 
servers.  The NT architecture is a multiple master domain model.  The NCC controlled 
domain has a two-way trust with an external agency.  This relationship allows the 
external agency to control accounts and access to the network.  This is not a desirable 
configuration and the NCC is working to remove the external domain.  Personnel from 
Site 1 were not interviewed. 
Site 2 
Site 2 has approximately 4,000 user accounts.  The ATM backbone network 
consists of vendor C switches with two primary vendor C switch routers.  The access 
layer, first 400 feet to the user, is primarily comprised of vendor C routers.  Network 
services are provided by a Windows NT, Hybrid Single Master Domain architecture with 
five trusting resource domains.  Three personnel from Site 2 were interviewed for this 
research project.  
Site 3 
Site 3 has approximately 300 user accounts and the base backbone is a large flat 
network with all users, servers, and infrastructure equipment in the same broadcast 
domain.  The backbone consists of vendor C switches.  Distribution layer switches also 
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serve as access layer switches.  Network services are provided by a Single Master 
Windows NT domain with a one-way trust with an external entity.  One person from Site 
3 was interviewed for this research project.   
Site 4 
Site 4 has approximately 5,500 users, uses a Gigabit Ethernet backbone, and 
operates primarily vendor C equipment.  Unlike the first three sites, documented trip 
reports to this location were not available.  Site 4 is included in this study because two 
key informants are currently stationed at this location.  Site specific information was 
obtained during interviews.  
Site 5 
Site 5 has approximately 6,000 users, has a Gigabit Ethernet backbone, and 
operates all vendor C equipment.  A documented trip report was not available for this 
location.  This site is included because it is the current duty station of the most 
experienced key informant.  Site specific information was obtained from the interviewed 
informant. 
The comparison matrix below compares the five sites used in this study.  The 
matrix identifies differences in the type of network backbone, type of hardware, and 
method of providing network services via the type of Windows NT architecture 
employed.  All of the sites, except Site 1, use vendor C equipment.    
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Table 12, Site Comparison Matrix 
Locatio
n 
Approximate  
Number of 
Users 
Network 
Type 
Hardware Network 
Services 
Trip 
Report 
Interviews 
(Number) 
Site 1 2,000 ATM Vendor A 
and B 
Multiple Master 
Windows NT 
Architecture 
Yes No 
Site 2 4,000 ATM Vendor C Hybrid Single 
Master Windows 
NT Architecture  
Yes Yes (3) 
Site 3 280 Flat Vendor C Single Master 
Windows NT 
Architecture 
Yes Yes (1) 
Site 4 5,500 Gig E Vendor C unknown No Yes (2) 
Site 5 6,000 Gig E Vendor C unknown No Yes (1) 
 
Interview Data   
Network Control Center leadership at Sites 2 and 3 identified personnel with 
enough knowledge concerning the base network and the larger AFEN to make a 
contribution to this study.  Additionally, each interviewee was asked to refer someone 
they thought could contribute.  The goal established in Chapter III to interview at least 
five people at each of the locations was not met do to one of the following reasons:  not 
enough people working in the NCC processed knowledge beyond their assigned task 
(bigger picture perspective), individuals weren’t willing to participate, or NCC leadership 
did not approve interview request.  Despite these obstacles, personnel from four of the 
five locations were interviewed.  A total of seven interviews were conducted for this 
study.  Four interviews were conducted at locations with documented trip reports, three at 
Site 2 and one at Site 3.   Network Control Center management at Site 1 did not approve 
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the request to interview personnel.  Three key informant interviews were conducted, two 
at Site 4 and one at a Site 5, see the Interview Demographics table below.   
Table 13, Interview Demographics 
Location Interviewee Networking 
Experience (Yrs) 
Multiple 
Locations 
Employee 
Grade 
Site 2 2A 4.5 No SrA 
Site 2 2B 3 Yes SrA 
Site 2 2C 4 Yes SSgt 
Site 3 3 9 No Contractor 
Site 4 K1 8 Yes SSgt 
Site 4 K2 11 Yes MSgt 
Site 5 K3 17 Yes MSgt 
 
The attempt to only interview personnel with at least network management 
experience at two different Air Force locations was not successful.  At each location, the 
majority of personnel working in the NCCs only had experience with their current 
network.  However, some had several years experience and were informed of other 
networks through conversations and interactions with other network professionals 
assigned to other bases.  Key informant interviews from two locations increase the 
external validity and construct validity of the study.   
  All key informants possessed experience with multiple networks at multiple 
locations and at least eight years of networking experience.  Although the target interview 
pool of 15 personnel at the first three locations did not materialize, the interview results 
are insightful and add value to the current body of knowledge.  It was very difficult to 
locate personnel with enough networking experience, were willing to participate, had the 
time to be interviewed, and management granted access to, despite only having seven 
interview questions.   
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Investigative Questions 
This section addresses each of the five investigative questions in separate 
subsections.  In each subsection, the evidence is presented in the following sections, if 
applicable: document trip report information, interview data with select excerpts, and a 
summary of convergent information. 
Investigative Question One 
• Are BANs different throughout the Air Force? If so, how? 
The results of this study indicate BANs are different throughout the Air Force 
based on comparing documented trip reports, analyzing interview results, and reviewing 
existing literature.  In this study, sites are compared according to the range of 
considerations under the infrastructure attribute of the LISI model, see Figure 14.  The 
infrastructure attribute defines the range of components that enable interactions between 
systems including hardware, communications and networks, system services, and security 
(C4ISR, 1998).   This range of considerations minus security is used to determine if 
BANs at the five locations included in this study are different.  Security is excluded 
because the CITS program has effectively standardized a major portion of this area.  
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Figure 14, Paid Paradigm Reflecting Range of Considerations for Each Attribute 
 
Trip Report 
The comparison matrix, Table 12, developed from documented Base Assistance 
Team (BAT) trip reports and focused interviews reflect differences in the three areas of 
interest:  network type, hardware employed, and method for providing network services.  
The hardware area reflects the least amount of difference; four of five sites use vendor C 
equipment.   
Interview Question 1 
• Are base area networks throughout the Air Force the same or different?  Support 
for your reply? 
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Responses to this question substantially supported the thought that BANs are 
different.  Six out of seven interviewees stated that BANs are different, 86 percent, and 
one individual didn’t know if they were different or not because he has only worked at 
one base, 14 percent.  Interviewees at each of the four possible locations believe BANs 
are different, see Table 14 for a summary of responses by location.  Two individuals 
mention similarities and differences present among some BANs.  After discussing their 
responses further, they made it clear they believe the network architectures are different.  
Not one individual reported that BANs are the same.  The following statements were 
taken from interviews: 
• “Due mostly to working topologies and network saturation varying from base to 
base. Also if they were the same the AF wouldn’t be sending out teams to 
standardize” 
• Too much freedom is given at each base for the local commander to determine 
what can and can't be done on the network.  “When the risks are explained to 
them, the response is one of indifference, as long as they get what they want”. 
• Different bases stood up campus networks at different times 
• Funding has been haphazard at times; sometimes from the base, MAJCOM, AF, 
DOD, etc 
• Design decision making has been managed very differently at times by the AF 
engineers out of Tinker AFB 
• “Home grown solutions, implemented "on the cheap" at times, developed by local 
"experts".  I myself have been the guilty party of more than one of these local 
incarnations” 
 
Table 14, Interview Question 1 Response Summary 
Response Summary 
Questions 1 Interviewee(s) 
# of 
Individuals 
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Different 2B, 2C, 3, K1, K2,K3 6 86 4 
Don't Know 2A 1 14 1 
 
Literature Review 
An Air Force Education and Training Command briefing, for senior leaders, 
describes BANs as independent networks and a smorgasbord of hardware (AETC, 2003).  
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The briefing clearly articulates the problem and level of attention the situation has 
grasped.  Additionally, Block 30 of the CITS program provides an opportunity to 
establish common architectures, equipment, and training for BANs (Horn, 2004).  These 
sources provide further evidence that BANs are different.    
Investigative Question One Results Summary 
Convergent evidence is provided to support the believe that BANs are different 
throughout the Air Force.  First, the comparison matrix identified differences in three of 
the four areas identified in the PAID paradigm of the LISI model in Figure 14.  Second, 
the responses to interview question one align with the documentation in providing 
support that BANs are different.  Third, information from the literature provides 
additional support that BANs are different; specifically, a briefing for senior Air Force 
leaders and goals of Block 30 of the CITS program.   
Investigative Question Two 
• Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force? 
Nine different reasons for variety were found during the course of this research.  
Interview questions three and four, cross case analysis, and existing literature were used 
to answer investigative question two.  Interview question three was designed to solicit the 
primary reason for differences and question four was designed to gather additional 
reasons for variation.  However, only two additional responses were given to question 
four, the other responses were excluded because they duplicated responses provided for 
question three, see Table 15.  
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Interview Questions 3 and 4 
• What do you feel are the primary reasons base area networks across the Air 
Force are configured, arranged, and equipped differently? 
 
• Why is there so much variation concerning base area networks throughout the 
Air Force? 
 
Decentralized decision authorities is the primary reason interviewees gave for 
BANs  being configured, arranged, and equipped differently across the Air Force.  Three 
interviewees at two different locations gave this response, including two very 
knowledgeable key informants; 43 percent of all interviewees.     
The next significantly contributing factor is different funding avenues available 
for different bases.  Two very knowledgeable key informants located at different bases 
reported this response, 29 percent.  Different missions and security by being different was 
also reported by 29 percent of the interviewed pool.  However, these two responses were 
reported by two individuals at the same locations, see Table 15.  The following 
statements were taken from interview transcripts: 
• “Since there is no single focal point setting the rules, local commanders are 
free to do what they want at each base.  They are allowed to spend base funds 
upgrading infrastructure, hardware and software, as well as determining what 
they will and won't allow on an AF network”.  What was acceptable locally 
before may not be acceptable for the larger enterprise. 
• Different channels available for funding IT at each base and different support 
contracts 
• Timing, MAJCOM program management office (PMO) focus at the times of 
implementation created different technological pursuits  
• Inconsistent solutions coming from the engineers at Tinker AFB and the CITS 
PMO 
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Table 15, Interview Question 3 and 4 Response Summary 
Primary Reason for Difference, Q3 Interviewee(s)
# of 
Individuals
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Decentralized decision authorities 3,K1,K2 3 43% 2 
Different funding avenues K1,K3 2 29% 2 
Different Missions 2A,2B 2 29% 1 
Security by being different 2B,2C, 2 29% 1 
Networks evolved at various times K3 1 14% 1 
Implementing locally developed technical 
solutions K3 1 14% 1 
MAJCOMs not on the same page K3 1 14% 1 
Inconsistent solutions from levels above base K3 1 14% 1 
Why is there so much variation, Q4   Interviewee 
# of 
Individuals
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Base level decision authorities lack knowledge  K2 1 14% 1 
No idea 2C 1 14% 1 
 
Literature Review 
Existing literature supports the top interview responses.  The Air Force network 
operations hierarchy was designed to provide command relationships that ensured global 
systems interoperate without diminishing the authority of the local commanders to direct 
and manage the information technology assets under their control (DoAF, 2004).  
However, these relationships generated often conflicting and incompatible guidance.  The 
recent consolidation of three Air Force headquarters directorates into a single directorate 
responsible for networks and warfighter integration acknowledges the need for change 
and provides a solution (SAF, 2004).  This move should streamline policy development 
and enforcement.  Additionally, new DoD instructions require DISA to be involved in the 
development and operational testing of information technology assets (DoD, 2004b).   
Some of the replies to this question were reported at only one site or by one individual, 
but existing literature provides another source of support; see Table 16, Triangulated 
Response Summary.  Triangulation is a major strength of the case study methodology; 
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most importantly it establishes converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003:98).  First, each 
BAN is made up of existing and new components configured as a consolidated network 
(CITS, 2004).  As such, each is tailored to provide for the various mission of each 
installation.  Second, the combination of BANs that make up the AFEN evolved over 
time with explosive growth (DoAF, 2004).  During the 80s and 90s technology grew 
faster than regulatory guidance could be published.  As a result, locally developed 
solutions were common.  The responses listed in the Triangulated response table below 
provide convincing evidence because they are corroborated by multiple sources of data.   
Table 16, Triangulated Response Summary 
 
Investigative Question Two Results Summary 
In summary of the results for investigative question two, not one particular reason 
received was reported by a majority of interviewees.  However, the triangulated 
responses, identified in the table above, provide the most convincing evidence for why a 
variety of BANs are currently in use throughout the Air Force.  The top reported reason 
for variation is decentralized decision authorities with different funding avenues and 
different missions placing second and third, respectively.  The responses that are not 
triangulated provide good insight and should also be investigated further, see Table 17. 
Primary Reason for 
Difference, Q3 Interviewee(s) 
# of 
Individuals 
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Lit 
Review 
Decentralized decision 
authorities 3,K1,K2 3 43% 2 Yes 
Different funding avenues K1,K3 2 29% 2 Yes 
Different Missions 2A,2B 2 29% 1 Yes 
Networks evolved at various 
times K3 1 14% 1 Yes 
Implementing locally 
developed tech solutions K3 1 14% 1 Yes  
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Table 17, Single Source Response Summary 
Primary Reason for 
Difference, Q3 Interviewee 
# of 
Individuals 
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Lit 
Review 
Security by being different 2B,2C, 2 29% 1 No 
MAJCOMs not on the 
same page K3 1 14% 1 No 
Inconsistent solutions 
from levels above base K3 1 14% 1 No 
Why is there so much 
variation, Q4   Interviewee 
# of 
Individuals 
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Lit 
Review 
Base level Decision 
authorities lack 
knowledge  K2 1 14% 1 No 
 
Investigative Question Three 
• What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air 
Force? 
 
A range of nine problems were identified, from training to preventing 
standardization.  The third investigative question is answered by responses to interview 
question six and a cross case analysis of these responses.  
Interview Question 6 
•  Interview question six is identical to investigative question three.   
 
Training difficulties was significantly reported as a problem created by using a 
variety of BANs throughout the Air Force.  Five out of a possible seven interviewees 
sited training as a problem, 71 percent.  All of the very experienced key informants 
reported training as a problem.  Interviews from each of the four locations used in this 
study reported training as a problem.  Difficulty in troubleshooting problems is the 
second most significantly reported problem created by employing a variety of BANs 
throughout the Air Force.  Three individuals at three separate locations reported 
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troubleshooting as a problem, 43 percent.  Difficulty in this area can lead to denial of 
service for users and adversely affect mission accomplishment, the third most 
significantly reported problem.  Adverse impact on mission accomplishment is the third 
most significantly reported problem, but is the most important of the reported problems 
because training and troubleshooting problems have a direct impact on mission 
accomplishment.  This problem is reported by three people covering two different 
locations, 43 percent.  Adding to the significant of this problem is the fact that it is 
reported by all three of the experienced key informants.  The rest of the reported 
problems are identified in Table 18 below and provide important insight from 
practitioners that maintain and support BANs on a daily basis. Examples of training 
problems reported during interviews are listed below: 
• “Every time a technician moves to a new base they not only have to learn the 
new network layout, there is a high probability that the will have to learn a 
completely new vendor's equipment” 
• “When I get a new technician from Tech School, I pretty much know what 
level of experience I will be getting.  But when I get an "experienced" NCO 
inbound, I really have no idea what equipment that they will be familiar with”. 
• An experienced technician recently arrived to an installation that uses vendor 
B equipment with a Gigabit Ethernet backbone with network switches.  The 
technician is trained on vendor B equipment routers using an ATM backbone.  
He has a skill that will never be use at his current base.      
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Table 18, Interview Question 6 Response Summary  
Problems caused by 
variety of BANS, Q6 Interviewee(s) # of Individuals % of Individuals # of Sites
Training Difficulties 2C, 3, K1, K2, K3 5 71 4 
Difficulty troubleshooting 
problems  2A, 3, K1, 3 43 3 
Adverse impact on 
mission accomplishment K1, K2, K3 3 43 2 
Continuity  2C, K1 2 29 2 
Interoperability K1, K2 2 29 1 
Complicates planning for 
future K2 1 14 1 
Lost hours due to class 
attendance K3 1 14 1 
Multiple approval levels K2 1 14 1 
Prevents standardization 2B 1 14 1 
 
Investigative Question Three Results Summary 
In summary of the answers to investigative question three, training was the most 
significantly reported problem, followed by, troubleshooting difficulty and adverse 
impact on mission accomplishment.  Adverse impact on mission accomplishment is the 
most critical of the reported problems because problems with training and difficulty in 
troubleshooting will adversely impact mission accomplishment.  The actions of the key 
informants is noteworthy in this section.  The key informants all reported training 
difficulties and adverse impact on mission accomplishment.  Surprisingly, only one key 
informant reported difficulty in troubleshooting.  Difficulties with training were reported 
by personnel at all of the interviewed sites, Site 1 personnel were not interviewed.  
Troubleshooting difficulty was reported by personnel from three sites and adverse impact 
on mission accomplishment was reported by personnel at two of the four locations 
including all three key informants.   
Investigative Question Four 
• What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force? 
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The following four replies were identified by interviewees:  security through 
diversity, variety of training opportunities, tailoring to specific needs, and no advantage.  
Investigative question four is answered by responses to interview question five and a 
cross case analysis of the responses. 
Interview Question 5 
Interview question five is the same as investigative question four.  Security 
through diversity was the most significantly reported advantage of using a variety of 
BANs.  This advantage was reported by four out of seven people, 57 percent, covering all 
four locations used in this study.  Reporting individuals believe a variety of network 
architectures increases the difficulty in hacking into Air Force systems and limits the 
impact of equipment specific vulnerabilities or design flaws.  They fear that standard 
networks would be less secure because once a hacker gained access to one network it 
may be possible to gain access to other networks using similar techniques.  Diversity also 
protects against vulnerabilities designed for a particular vendor’s line of equipment or 
software.  Providing a variety of training opportunities is the second most significantly 
reported advantage.  Three out of seven reported it, 43 percent, covering two of the four 
sites used in this study.  Table 19, located below, provides a complete summary of the 
advantages reported.  None of the reported advantages was reported by more than one of 
the experienced key informants.  The following statements are excerpts from the 
interviews: 
• Need to understand that some standardization is needed, but for major security 
issues such as viruses not all bases can be the same; too much standardization 
makes it easier for hackers break into multiple networks 
• If a network incident takes down one network, it may not affect all networks 
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• “A single vendor supplying all of the equipment for the AF going out of business 
would be catastrophic” 
• A common vulnerability and/or failure prone to a particular piece of equipment 
would only affect locations that use the equipment 
• Helps to see different network architectures, in regards to troubleshooting and just 
basic network knowledge; the more variety the better your technicians are going 
to be 
• “Broad training opportunities and cost savings by just buying what is needed 
instead of purchasing a standard package that provides more capability than 
required” 
• None, - UPS has a standard architecture across the globe, why can’t we emulate 
their process? 
 
Table 19, Interview Question 5 Response Summary 
Advantages created by a 
variety of BANs, Q5   Interviewee(s) 
# of 
Individuals
% of 
Individuals 
# of 
Sites 
Security through diversity 2B, 2C, 3, K3 4 57 4 
Variety of training opportunities 2B, 2C, K1  3 43 2 
Tailoring to specific needs 2A, K1 2 29 2 
No advantage K2 1 14 1 
 
Investigative Question Four Results Summary 
The results of investigative question four identified three advantages.  Security 
through diversity was the top reported advantage, reported by 57 percent.  Variety of 
training opportunities was reported by 43 percent of the interviewees and tailoring to 
specific needs was reported by 29 percent.  
Investigative Question Five 
• How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs? 
Investigative question five identifies potential responses to the current state of 
BANs.  This investigative question is answered by interview question seven, cross case 
analysis of responses, and a review of existing literature.  The interview results show a 
slight majority in support of developing standard baseline architectures and 
implementation plans to correct disparate BANs throughout the Air Force.  Existing 
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literature compliments the interview data by promoting the open systems strategy over 
attempting to standardize equipment everywhere, especially when the in question is 
rapidly evolving.   
Interview Question 7 
• How do you think the Air Force should respond to the current state of base area 
networks? 
 
Fifty-seven percent of interviewed personnel believe developing standard baseline 
architectures and a prioritized implementation plan is the best way to deal with the 
current state of BANs.  This slight majority consists of four out of seven people from 
three of the four interviewed locations.  The three experienced key informants are in 
agreement.  Responses below the top response were not reported by more than one 
interviewee, no agreement is reached on any other response; each response below the top 
response represents fourteen percent of interviewed personnel.  Table 20 provides a 
complete summary of responses to interview question seven.  The following comments 
were reported during interviews:   
• “Develop model and strategic plan for standardizing to 1 AF network with central 
approval (remove lower levels from approval process)” 
• “Institute baseline architectures, regardless of MAJCOM and put the horse before 
the cart and implement Tech School and follow on classes to support the new 
baselines, BEFORE THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED.” 
• Secure data by responding to weaknesses first, backdoors and vulnerabilities.  
Work gradually towards a standard network AF wide 
• Top down implementation plan, based on the number of users at a base.  Much 
like CITS has done with its NO/IA equipment.  Each base gets x number of 
servers to support users, a couple of file servers, anti-virus servers, email, domain 
controllers, and a network backup solution that will handle a tape backup of 
critical systems.  “The base would not be allowed to add to or change this setup 
without justification and approval from the top.”  Publish directives stating how 
much email space, and server space each user is allotted, and have consequences 
for commanders that try to change things without approval. 
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Table 20, Interview Question 7 Response Summary 
Response Summary Question 7, 
Response to Disparate BANs   Interviewee(s)
# of 
Individuals 
% of 
Individuals
# of 
Sites 
Develop standard baseline architectures 
and a prioritized implementation plan 
(secure vulnerabilities first, other areas 
through attrition)  3,K1,K2,K3 4 57 3 
NOSC and Base Technicians work better 
together 2b 1 14 1 
Standardize from lowest level up 2c 1 14 1 
Standardize from top down 3 1 14 1 
Publish required standards 3 1 14 1 
Don't Know 2a 1 14 1 
 
Literature Review 
Existing literature under the standardization body of knowledge supports caution 
in attempting to standardize volatile technology.  In attempting to improve 
standardization, the Defense Standardization Program (DSP) guidance acknowledges that 
it may not be practical or desirable to standardize when technology is rapidly evolving or 
the desired solution or items go out of production after a short period (DoD, 2000a).  This 
is extremely applicable to Air Force BANs.  According to the updated version of Moore’s 
Law, computing power doubles every 18 months and is expected to maintain this course 
for at least two more decades (Intel, 2004).  Before 130 locations could be equipped and 
installed with the same suite of equipment, replacement technology for locations 
receiving the initial install would be required.  In these instances, the DSP suggest 
employing standard interfaces or protocols provided under the open systems strategy 
(DoD, 2000a). 
The open systems strategy promotes modular design tenets and widely supported 
and consensus based standards for key interfaces to develop affordable and adaptable 
information systems (DAG, 2004).  Under this strategy, tremendous flexibility is offered 
 
 89 
 
by providing a standardized “plug and play” capability among physical and electronic 
interfaces, while allowing equipment upgrades to keep pace with technological advances 
(DoD, 2000a).  The Open System Joint Task Force (OSJTF), a chartered and cooperative 
effort of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
seeks to sponsor and accelerate the adoption of an open system approach for new systems 
and system upgrades within DoD (DLA, 2004).  Instead of attempting to dictate the use 
of common hardware everywhere, the task force seeks to standardize according to each 
unique need while retaining the advantages of common architecture and compatible 
major interfaces (DLA, 2004).   
The Defense Information System Agency maintains the DISR, a consolidated 
standards registry that replaced the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA).  This registry is 
available on-line and identifies interfaces and standards that are technically mature and 
stable (DoD 2004).  Although DoD guidance requires all components to use and 
implement the standards identified in the registry, Air Force level guidance is not 
available.  Air Force guidance does exist on the Air Force JTA, but the DoD JTA has 
been replaced by the DISR.    
Investigative Question Five Results Summary 
Investigative question five results consist of a range of six different responses 
recorded during focused interviews and information retrieved from existing literature.  Of 
the six recorded interview responses, developing and implementing standard baseline 
architectures was reported by fifty-seven percent of interviewed personnel; no other 
response was reported by more than one individual; interview data is supported by 
literature.  Existing literature finds standardization in the technology arena is not always 
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beneficial especially when the technology is rapidly evolving or items remain in 
production for short periods of time, as is the case with networking equipment.  The 
literature also supports modular design tenets and the use of consensus based standards 
for key interfaces instead of attempting to standardize equipment everywhere.  
Additionally, Air Force guidance on concerning the DoD consolidated registry, DISR, is 
needed.  
Main Research Question 
• Should the Air Force Standardize Base Area Networks? 
Yes, the results of five investigative questions support the development and 
funding of standard baseline architectures from a high level in the department of the Air 
Force; reducing lower levels removes opportunities to deviate from accepted standards.  
Existing literature reveals the existence of a DoD composite repository of standards and a 
Joint Task Force for accelerating the adoption of open systems practices.  However, Air 
Force guidance is not currently available. 
The main research question is answered by the results of the five investigative 
questions.  To address investigative question one, documented trip reports, interview data 
and existing literature established that BANs are different throughout the Air Force.   
To address investigative question two, interview data and existing literature 
identified the following nine reasons for variation in Air Force BANs: decentralized 
decision authorities, different funding avenues for bases, different missions, networks 
evolved at different times, implementing locally developed technical solutions, security 
by being different, MAJCOMs not being on the same page, inconsistent solutions from 
levels above the base, and base-level decision authorities lacking knowledge to make 
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network architecture decisions.  The first five are supported by multiple sources of 
information and are the most significant sources of variation.  
  To address investigative question three, interview data identified the following 
nine problems created by employing a variety of BANs throughout the Air Froce:  
training difficulties, troubleshooting problems, adverse impact on mission 
accomplishment, continuity problems, interoperability concerns, planning for the future, 
lost hours, multiple approval levels, and prevent standardization.  The first four were 
reported by multiple individuals at more than on location and represent the most 
significant problems caused by using a variety of BANs.   
To address investigative question number four, interview data identified the 
following three advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force:  
security through diversity, variety of training opportunities, and tailoring to specific 
needs.  Each response was reported by multiple individuals at more than one location.   
To address investigative question number five, interview data and existing 
literature to identify how the Air Force should respond to the current state of BANs.  
Interview data supports the development of standard baseline architectures to address 
varying situations at different locations.  Existing literature supports adhering to the open 
systems strategy of concentrating on major interfaces and consensus based standards.  A 
mechanism, the DISR, to support this line of action is established and reinforced by the 
creation of the Joint Force Task Force to help accelerate the adoption of open systems 
practices; however, Air Force guidance is not available at this time.  Table 21 illustrates 
how the research model presented in the overview section of this chapter, Figure 13, is 
followed to answer the main research question.  
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Table 21, Main Research Question Evidence Summary  
Research Stage Research Results 
Are BANs 
different 
Trip reports, interview results, and existing literature provide 
evidence that BANs are different 
Reasons for 
Differences 
Interview data and existing research identified the following nine 
reasons for variation: 
- Decentralized decision authorities 
- Different funding avenues 
- Different missions 
- Networks evolved at various times 
- Implementing locally developed tech solutions 
- Security by being different 
- MAJCOMs not on the same page 
- Inconsistent solutions from levels above base 
- Base level decision makers lack knowledge 
Disadvantages of 
Variability 
Interview data identified the following nine problems created by 
using a variety of BANs: 
- Training difficulties 
- Difficulty troubleshooting problems 
- Adverse impact on mission accomplishment 
- Continuity 
- Interoperability 
- Complicates planning for future 
- Lost hours due to class attendance 
- Multiple approval levels 
- Prevents standardization 
Advantages of 
Variability 
Interview data identified the following three advantages of using a 
variety of BANs: 
- Security through diversity 
- Variety of training opportunities 
- Tailoring to specific needs 
How Should AF 
Respond to current 
BANs 
Interview data promoted establishing baseline architectures to 
address different situations at bases 
Existing literature supported following the open systems strategy to 
ensure the compatibility of key interfaces instead of attempting to 
standardize equipment everywhere  
Should AF 
standardize BANS 
Investigative question results indicate YES, by adhering to the open 
systems strategy to provide baseline architectures for BANs  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the exploratory research methodology 
outlined in Chapter III.  Documented AFCA SCOPE Network trip reports, focused 
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interviews, and a detailed literature review were used to provide convergent sources of 
information for reaching the presented results.  A total of five sites were used in this 
study to address five investigative questions and ultimately answer the main research 
question; documented trip reports were available for three locations and focused 
interviews were completed at four locations. 
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 V.  Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Overview 
The purpose of this exploratory research of Air Force BANs was to increase 
understanding and establish points of interest for further investigation.  Documented trip 
reports, interview transcripts, and existing literature provided evidence that BANs are 
different throughout the Air Force, identified nine reasons for variation, identified nine 
disadvantages and three advantages of employing a variety of BANs, and recommended 
an Air Force response to the current state of disparate BANs.  A comparison of interview 
data and documented trip reports covering five locations provided these results.  This 
chapter discusses the interviewees; research results, implications, and recommendation; 
suggestions for future research; and a conclusion.  In parallel to this research, Lieutenant 
Jamie Sharkey conducted a thesis on the key issues pertaining to Air Force enterprise 
architecture management.     
Discussion of Interviewees 
Research participants were purposefully selected based on their knowledge and 
experience in BANs.  Accordingly, even the responses reported from only one individual 
at one location provide key insight.  Comparing responses from several sites increases the 
external validity by identifying repeated responses; however, all responses, repeated or 
not, provide valuable insight.  Participants in this study urged their support for any effort 
to reduce the amount of variation that currently exists in our BANs across the Air Force.  
Members firmly believe there must be a better way to operate.  Frustrations stem from 
investing energy into developing technical capabilities only to have those capabilities 
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relegated to a hobby upon reassignment to a new location.  Training new personnel 
provides an additional source of frustration.  New NCC personnel face a steep learning 
curve; this isn’t peculiar to information technology career fields.  However, rapidly 
changing technology, a salient characteristic of these career fields, results in a shortage of 
experienced trainers in the field and attendance at off-site classes reduces the available 
workforce and compounds the problem of providing quality base level communications 
support.  Experienced personnel declined to participate because they simply did not have 
time.      
Discussion of Research Results 
 
The research results provide a unique and rich perspective by documenting input 
from informed practitioners tasked to maintain and support BANs on a daily basis and 
coupling these insights with information provided by existing literature.  Increased 
information demands, mandates for interoperability, rapidly changing technology, and 
guidance from multiple sources continue to complicate the daily challenge of providing 
reliable and effective communications to the right person, at the right time, and in the 
right format.  The results provide signposts for improving our current capabilities and 
identifying potential pitfalls.  Developing solutions for issues identified in this section is 
not enough; perception changing strategies are required.  
Procedures, an attribute of the LISI model, emerged as a common theme in the 
research results.  This attribute is the primary enabler for the highest level of 
interoperability in the LISI model, the enterprise level or level four.  This highest level of 
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interoperability is needed to fully implement the GIG.  The levels and their associated 
primary enablers are reflected in Table 22.  
Table 22, LISI Primary Enabling Attributes (Clark, 1999) 
 
As networks and computer systems evolve and mature up through the levels, 
different attributes act as key enablers.  Ironically, infrastructure, used in this research as 
a comparison construct, is the primary enabler at the very low level of peer-to-peer 
interoperability and procedures is at the top level of interoperability.  According to the 
LISI model, effective management and coordination of information technology related 
procedures and practices across the Air Force would enable interoperability at the 
Enterprise level.  However, networks must mature through the lower levels first by 
fostering and developing the key enablers for each level; applications, data, and 
procedures, respectively.   
Should BANs look the same or different? 
Initial inspection of the interview results shows an even split, no consensus, 
between the choice of same or different.  Upon further review, a clear demarcation exists 
between practitioners with over eight years experience and those with less than five years 
experience; more experienced practitioners believe networks should look the same.  The 
researcher believes the primary reason for the distribution of the results is experienced 
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personnel have a better understanding of the obstacles encountered when attempting to 
maintain, support, and connect disparate systems and networks.   
The implications of these findings indicate a lack of consensus, either way, on this 
issue and provide evidence that additional research, education, and information 
dissemination is needed to help personnel work effectively towards a common goal of 
leveraging information and technology to increase interoperability and integration, as 
outlined in Joint Vision 2020.  Recommend implementing information sharing initiatives 
through NOSCs or adding education sessions to AFCA base assistance visits to share 
policy, best practices, and disseminate information concerning the road ahead. 
Are BANs different throughout the Air Force? 
This study used an established construct, infrastructure element of the LISI 
model, to compare sites; the results strongly indicate BANs are different.  This finding 
does not ignore the similarities that are present; instead it highlights the presence of major 
differences.  The U.S. Code Title 10 provides a structured and disciplined approach to 
mission accomplishment by requiring the Armed Forces to organize, train, and equip 
their respective forces.   Air Force disparate networks severely degrade the service’s 
ability to satisfy the fundamental Title 10 requirements.  As a direct result, mission 
effectiveness is decreased.  Disparate networks make it more difficult to achieve 
information superiority and integration.  In order to provide reliable access to needed 
information; the cables, systems, and networks must be effectively organized, controlled, 
and managed.  Standardized architectures for unclassified and classified networks are a 
top level requirement of the CITS Block 30 initiative; however, this initiative is still in 
development.  
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Inherent differences in bases due to missions, terrain, or other environmental 
factors present a formidable challenge; however, a better job must be done in providing 
standardized base level communications.  Capitalizing on the similarities is essential; 
standard networks can be developed for the finite categories all bases fall into.  
Implementing standard processes, procedures, and best practices for common tasks would 
greatly simplify BAN management and network operations. 
Implications of these findings indicate BANs are different and work is required to 
ensure information technology assets are used more effectively to achieve the vision 
outlined in Joint Vision 2020.  Recommend enforcing standard processes, procedures, 
and best practices for common task across the Air Force to reduce redundancy and site-
specific solutions for functions performed at multiple locations.    
Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air 
Force? 
All of the results for this investigative question stem from the previous Air Force 
focus for managing networks; centered on the NCC at each location.  This arrangement 
worked well in the initial stages of network development during the 1980s and 1990s 
because mature enterprise guidance was not available.  The importance of information 
and the role of the networks have evolved along with the DoD doctrine that now requires 
interoperability, integration, and global access to achieve decision superiority.  Mature 
enterprise guidance is now available and the focus for managing networks has moved 
from individual NCCs to NOSCs; a more centralized approach.  The recent 
announcement of plans to consolidate three headquarters organizations into a single 
directorate responsible for networks and warfighting integration is a clear sign Air Force 
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leadership acknowledges the need for a fundamental change in managing information 
technology assets; consolidation plans will change the Air Force CIO from a civilian 
position to a three star general (SECAF, 2004). 
Implications of the research results reflect a major milestone in the development 
of BANs.  The structure and focus for managing these critical assets is in transition.  
Centralized management and control are definitely a step in the right direction.  Base 
level networks are no longer just base assets.  Operating globally deployed unmanned 
aerial vehicles from stateside locations, warfighters accessing home station technical or 
support data from austere locations, and providing video conferencing between family 
and deployed military members are just a few examples of current reachback 
applications; the future holds additional applications.  Base are networks play a pivotal 
role in the defense of our nation and should be managed at higher levels commensurate 
with their overall contribution to the fight; previous paradigms and delineation points are 
not useful.  Policy should originate at the highest levels and get implemented across 
traditional barriers of commands and bases to achieve maximum benefit for the Air Force 
as a whole.  Shortening the kill chain, introduced in the Research Significance section of 
Chapter I, requires all phases of the AFEN and GIG; including BANs, to achieve the 
optimal effects needed to defeat future adversaries and challenges.  In spite of policy 
originated at a macro level and a big picture mission focus, support and quality of service 
for users at the lowest level must remain top priorities.  Service to base level users 
represents the critical link between warfighters and technology and has a direct impact on 
mission accomplishment.  Diligence is required to minimize the effects of any negative 
unintended consequences.  Recommend the development of transition strategies for 
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initial stages and initiatives to foster very close relationships between NOSC and NCC 
personnel to overcome barriers associated with fault isolation and repair from a distance.  
Additionally, recommend monitoring the quality of service and amount of down time 
following the transition to SCOPE EDGE to determine if the reduction in base assistance 
team visits from 120 visits in 18 months to 30 visits in 12 months will have a detrimental 
effect.         
What problems are created by using various BANs throughout the 
Air Force? 
The results identified by this investigative question are related to maintaining 
BANs and the consequences of failing to maintain them.   Problems satisfying two of the 
Title 10 responsibilities, training and equipping, were addressed by the results of this 
investigative question.  Differences in network equipment, processes, and systems require 
a unique and complex training program to provide instruction over a wide range of 
diverse situations.  The differences also reduce the size and composition of the 
knowledge base for developing experts.  As a result of increased variation, many small 
and specialized groups form instead of fewer but larger groups of experts that improve 
capabilities through increased opportunities to share information and lessons learned. 
Administering such a training program is very difficult and time consuming; equipping 
largely diversified networks is equally difficult.   
Implications of these results suggestion widespread problems in training exist and 
acquisition reform is needed to provide common equipment for practitioners.  The $5 
billion dollars in required network upgrades, estimated by the Air Force, to implement 
Joint Vision 2020 are wasted if personnel are not trained to maintain the developed 
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networks.  Providing common equipment will positively impact current training 
problems.  Block 30 of the CITS program incorporates vendor selection and will help 
reduce some variation.  Recommend modifying the technical school training curriculums 
to reflect the use of commercial off the self products.  For information technology related 
career fields, the bulk the technical instruction should come from commercial agencies.  
Attempting to maintain current lesson plans in Air Force operated classrooms providing 
technical instruction is a futile attempt to hold on a obsolete paradigm.  Reducing 
variation reduces the amount of different items required to perform the similar functions, 
significantly reduces the logistics footprint required to support these items, and will aid 
the development of effective training programs.  Additionally, disparate networks make it 
more difficult to find or use spare parts when needed.  
What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the 
Air Force? 
The results of this investigative question reveal security through diversity and the 
variety of training opportunities as the most advantageous benefits; only three benefits 
were identified compared to nine reported problems or disadvantages from the results of 
the previous investigative question.  Training is identified as a problem and a benefit.  
Security through diversity is seen as a benefit because current security practices are 
ineffective; conveys a lack of confidence.  Attempting to develop and implement 
effective security patches and procedures for the vast equipment configurations 
comprising our networks is very complex; however, the diversity does eliminate single 
points of failure concerning specific equipment or software. 
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Implications of these research results indicate a need to determine if the benefits 
of security through diversity are stronger than the potentially improved security that can 
be achieved by quickly monitoring and updating a less diverse suite of equipment and 
software; the researcher strongly believes greater security benefits are provided by 
effectively managing less diversity.  The benefits obtained through security by diversity 
are minimized by the other problems identified by the previous investigative question.  
Recommend promoting security successes or capabilities to increase confidence and 
promoting opportunities to fine tune networking skills by concentrating on a reduced 
number of equipment and applications; quality over quantity.   
How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs? 
 
Results of this investigative question dismiss the idea of attempting to standardize 
equipment everywhere throughout the Air Force.  Instead, the results promote the 
development of baseline architectures to exploit the benefits of the opens systems 
strategy for interoperability and following the guidelines of the Defense Standardization 
program.  Additionally, results identified a gap in Air Force guidance concerning the 
DoD consolidated standards registry, DISR.   
Implications of these results show practitioners are in tune with current strategies 
for improving standardization and identify a need to publish Air Force guidance 
concerning linking Air Force initiatives with DoD efforts and guidance, specifically the 
DISR.  Recommend publishing guidance and promoting the use of the registry in 
developing and obtaining future networks, systems, and equipment.    
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Suggested Future Research 
 
This section outlines opportunities for future research.  First, duplicate this study 
using locations with similar sized BANS to determine if the results are complimentary.  
Comparing similar sized BANs will determine if identified variation and results are 
unique to this study.  Second, repeat this study using observations instead of documented 
reports or interviews to eliminate any bias introduce by the authors of the documented 
trip reports.  Third, investigate how many practitioners develop skills that are applicable 
at one location, but not used at subsequent duty assignments.  Research will determine if 
selective assignment procedures are needed for technicians with specialized skill sets.    
Fourth, conduct surveys using this studies research results to explore support for sources 
of variation, problems and advantages of variation, and proposed the Air Force response 
to the current state of BANs.   Fifth, perform similar study using commercial or 
government agencies to determine if similar results are achieved; the banking industry 
has security requirements similar to the military and could provide useful information. 
Conclusion  
This study concludes that the Air Force should standardize BANs in accordance 
with principles of the open systems approach to weapons systems acquisition and fund 
implementation from the highest level.  In coming to this conclusion several important 
issues were uncovered.  First, additional research is required concerning BANs and to tap 
the knowledge of current practitioners; virtually nothing has been published in this area.  
Second, the shift to a more centralized approach to managing Air Force networks is a 
significant development that should be monitored closely for unintended consequences.  
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Fourth, coordinating Air Force information technology procedures and practices are key 
enablers for achieving the enterprise level interoperability required to implement the 
GIG; considerable attention should be applied to controlling practices in order to fully 
exploit advantages provided by technology.  Implementing more standardization will 
make it possible to manage BANs and the AFEN more effectively, improve training, 
reduce the length of outages, enhance interoperability, aid integration efforts, 
significantly increase operational capability, and leverage technology to help implement 
Joint Vision 2020.     
This research provides leaders and managers with insightful information 
concerning BANs and successfully contributes to the existing body of knowledge by 
identifying differences in Air Force BANs, discovering sources of differences, revealing 
advantages and disadvantages of variety, providing a recommended response to the 
current state of BANs, and pinpointing additional areas for study.  
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